Foreign Policy In Focus//Institute for Polcy Studies November 9, 2011
Also: Eurasia Review, Truthout, Huffington Post, Antiwar.com and Scott Horton Show: The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, in a move initiated by the Obama administration, has voted to waive Bush-era human rights restrictions on military aid to the Islam Karimov dictatorship in Uzbekistan, one of the most brutal and repressive regimes on the planet…
Category: FPIF Regional Profile
FPIF Regional Profile
Time to Question the U.S. Role In Saudi Arabia
The terrorist bombings that struck Saudi Arabia on May 12th have raised a number of serious questions regarding American security interests in the Middle East. First of all, the attacks underscore the concern expressed by many independent strategic analysts that the United States has been squandering its intelligence and military resources toward Iraq–which had nothing to do with al Qaeda and posed no direct danger to the United States–and not toward al Qaeda itself, which is the real threat.
More importantly, however, the bombings bring to the fore the question of whether U.S. interests have been enhanced or threatened by the cozy American relationship with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has traditionally been the most important American ally in the Arab or Islamic world. It is run exclusively by a royal family that allows neither public dissent nor an independent press. Those who dare challenge the regime or its policies are punished severely. There is no constitution, no political parties, and no legislature. It was under such an environment of repression that Osama bin Laden and most of his followers first emerged.
Long shielded by the monarchy’s willingness to supply the United States with cheap oil, to subsidize the American arms industry with major weapons purchases, and to make lucrative deals with other major U.S. corporate interests, the United States has allowed this family dictatorship to get away with practices that would have been considered unacceptable from almost any other country.
Traditions of Hypocrisy
Both Democratic and Republican administrations have revealed their blatant hypocrisy by wailing about the plight of Afghan women while being dismissive of the treatment of Saudi women; by condemning the rigid Islamic laws in Iran as human rights violations while defending the even more repressive variants in Saudi Arabia as somehow an inherent part of their culture; by demanding that Palestinian statehood be dependent upon establishing a leadership committed to democracy and accountability while backing the corrupt and autocratic Saudi leadership.
Human rights activists for years have been raising doubts about the close strategic relationship both Democratic and Republican parties have had with the Saudi regime, particularly the massive arms transfers and military training, including its repressive internal security apparatus. Such critics have railed against the regime’s misogyny, theocratic fascism, and links to terrorism, but to no avail. Despite the close ties between Washington and Riyadh, there have never been any congressional hearings–under either Republican or Democratic leaderships–regarding human rights abuses by the Saudi government.
F. Gregory Gause III, a contemporary specialist on Saudi Arabia at the University of Vermont, notes: “The truth is the more democratic the Saudis become, the less cooperative they will be with us. So why should we want that?”
Such a policy raises both serious moral questions and as well as serious doubts about whether the United States really cares about freedom for Iraq while it helps make possible repression by other Arab governments.
The Wahabbi Tradition
While there is little evidence to suggest that the top leadership of Saudi Arabia supports the al Qaeda terrorist network or other extremists, there has been an undeniably lax attitude toward cracking down on financial support for such dangerous organizations under the guise of Islamic charities, particularly among the Wahabbi elites and even elements within the very sizable Saudi royal family itself.
Wahabbism is a particularly reactionary interpretation of Islam, which–while not advocating terrorism–has contributed to the theological underpinnings for al Qaeda and like-minded groups. The Saudis have funded Wahabbi religious education throughout the Islamic world, often in places where it has not only been the sole religious education available, but sometimes also the only formal education of any kind. The U.S.-backed Saudi regime, then, is more responsible than any other government for the spread of this dangerous turn to the right in Islamic theology in recent decades. The global reach of Wahabbism is made possible in large part to the movement’s generous funding, which is a result of the billions of petrodollars flowing to Saudi Arabia from the West–in particular, the United States.
Fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were Saudi, most of the al Qaeda leadership is Saudi, and much of the money trail has already been linked to Saudi Arabia. By contrast, none of the hijackers were Iraqi, no one in the al Qaeda leadership is Iraqi, and none of the money trail has been linked to Iraq. Yet the Bush administration and the leaders of both parties in Congress insisted that Iraq–and not the pro-American Saudi government–had to be the priority in the “war on terror.” In fact, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration initially ordered U.S. immigration officials to target immigrants and visitors from Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Sudan but not those from Saudi Arabia.
Support for the family dictatorship in Saudi Arabia has been a prevailing theme of U.S. policy for several decades. In 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abel-Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Arabian kingdom that now bears his family’s name, and forged the alliance that remains to this day: in return for open access to Saudi oil, the United States would protect the royal family from its enemies, both external and internal.
Support for the Royal Family
This policy has remained in force under both Democratic and Republican administrations. For example, in 1981, President Ronald Reagan declared “I will not permit [Saudi Arabia] to be an Iran,” referring to the successful uprising that had ousted the U.S.-backed Shah two years earlier. Under Reagan, American trainers provided direct assistance to Saudi National Guard (SANG) units that crushed a popular uprising.
The SANG, whose primary function is internal security, is almost entirely armed, trained, and managed by the United States, largely through a network of military contractors. It is noteworthy that al Qaeda’s first terrorist attack, a November 1995 bombing in Riyadh that killed five American servicemen, was targeted at a U.S.-operated SANG training center.
Indeed, one of the targets of the May 12 bombings was a residential compound for employees of the Vinell Corporation, the U.S. firm that has been primarily responsible for training SANG forces. The presence in Saudi cities of these white collar mercenaries, which help prop up the country’s despotic regime, is at least as provocative as the presence of uniformed American forces out in the desert, most of whom are now being transferred to bases in the tiny neighboring sheikdom of Qatar.
Al Qaeda believes that the Saudi regime is corrupt and evil in large part because the royal family has squandered its wealth for personal consumption and exotic weaponry while most Arabs suffer in poverty. That group is further angered by the regime’s tendency to persecute those who advocate for more ethical priorities. It is angry with the United States, therefore, for propping up such a regime. The U.S.-Saudi alliance, in al Qaeda’s view, further illustrates the depravity of the Saudi rulers in their decision to allow American troops and advisers on what they see as sacred Saudi soil in order to keep the regime in power. Such a regime is anti-Islamic, from its perspective, and therefore needs to be overthrown.
So, the first challenge, in the eyes of al Qaeda, is to oust the United States from the region, since it is the U.S. military that is keeping the corrupt Saudi regime in power. Given that al Qaeda is no match for the United States militarily, al Qaeda leadership therefore rationalizes the use of terrorism.
As a result, even putting aside moral arguments against backing such regimes as Saudi Arabia, there are serious questions as to whether the large-scale arms transfers and ongoing U.S. military presence in the Gulf really enhances American security interests. Rather than protecting the United States from its enemies, these policies appear to be creating enemies. On top of all this, the United States may also be supporting a lost cause.
A Lost Cause?
A secret CIA memo circulated at the National Security Council and State Department that was leaked to the press in the spring of 2002 noted how the “culture of royal excess” in Saudi Arabia “has ruled over the kingdom with documented human rights abuses… Democracy has never been part of the equation.” The study also reportedly describes the House of Saud as an “anachronism” that is “inherently fragile” and that there were “serious concerns about long-term stability.”
One can only think back to the 1970s, when the United States was also sending arms and advisers to prop up another Persian Gulf monarchy despite the regime’s severe repression and warnings that such support could lead to a radical Islamic backlash–Iran.
Traditionally, criticism of U.S. support for the Saudi regime has come from the left. In an interesting twist, however, the past year has witnessed an unprecedented degree of anti-Saudi rhetoric from right-wing think tanks, the media, and some sectors of the administration.
The first round came last spring, after Saudi crown prince Abdullah convinced every Arab government, including the Palestinian Authority, to formally declare their willingness to provide security guarantees for and full diplomatic recognition of Israel in return for the Israel’s total withdrawal from Arab lands seized in the 1967 war. This was the most complete Arab acceptance to date of the “land for peace” formula spelled out in the U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, long seen as the basis for Middle East peace. However, the Israeli government and its supporters in Washington –who support Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s insistence on holding on to much of the occupied territories–rejected the proposal.
This second round of attacks against Saudi Arabia came as that government increased its outspoken opposition to U.S. plans to invade Iraq. The Saudis long despised Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and were the principal backer of the U.S.-led Gulf War in 1991, yet they believe that the recent U.S. invasion was unnecessary, illegal, and likely to destabilize the region. In effect, it appears that it is not Saudi extremism that has resulted in a long-overdue criticism of the regime, but Saudi moderation.
The lesson Washington appears to be trying to communicate is, “If you challenge our policies on Iraq, on Israel, or anywhere else, you may become the next target of ‘the war on terrorism’.”
Will Saudi Arabia be yet another case of where, like Manuel Noriega’s Panama and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the United States supports a dictatorship for years only to suddenly declare it such a threat that the country must be invaded and the regime overthrown? Such an invasion of Saudi Arabia is already being talked about openly, even as the chaos and resulting dangers from the aftermath of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming increasingly apparent.
Why is it that Washington cannot seem to grasp that that there are more enlightened policy alternatives than the extremes of appeasement and of war?
http://www.fpif.org/articles/time_to_question_the_us_role_in_saudi_arabia
Western Sahara (Conflict Profile)
History
Traditionally inhabited by nomadic Arab tribes with a long history of resistance to outside domination, the area known as Spanish Sahara was occupied by Spain during much of the twentieth century and held for more than a decade after most African countries achieved their independence. The nationalist Polisario Front launched an armed independence struggle against Spain in 1973, and Madrid eventually promised to grant independence. Irredentist claims by Morocco and Mauritania were brought before the International Court of Justice, which ruled in 1975 that the right of self-determination was paramount. A UN Commission visited the territory that same year and reported that the vast majority of Sahrawis supported independence. Despite this and its earlier pledge to the Polisario, Spain partitioned the territory between Morocco and Mauritania in November 1975. Most of the population fled into refugee camps administered by the Polisario in neighboring western Algeria. The Polisario proclaimed independence as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and–with Algerian-supplied weaponry–fought the occupying armies. By 1982, the Polisario had liberated most of the territory, but large-scale French and American military aid reversed the war in Morocco’s favor, resulting in Moroccan control of virtually the entire country, including the establishment of an 800-mile “wall” to exclude the Polisario from their own country. Meanwhile, Rabat was encouraging thousands of Moroccan settlers to emigrate to Western Sahara. A military stalemate continued until 1991, when a cease-fire was declared and plans were established for a UN-supervised referendum on the fate of the territory. Morocco, however, has prevented the referendum from proceeding by insisting upon stacking the voter rolls with Moroccan citizens that it claims have tribal links to the Western Sahara.
Main Actors
Kingdom of Morocco–occupies Western Sahara
Polisario Front–nationalist movement of Western Sahara
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic–government-in-exile of Western Sahara led by the Polisario Front, recognized by more than 70 countries
Islamic Republic of Mauritania–granted administration of southern third of Western Sahara in 1975; renounced claim in 1978 after defeat by the Polisario
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria–principal backer of the Polisario and home to most of the Sahrawi refugee population
Republic of France–major military and diplomatic supporter of Morocco
United States–major military and diplomatic supporter of Morocco
Kingdom of Spain–colonial ruler of Western Sahara
Proposed Solutions and Evaluation of Prospects
Despite initial demands by the UN Security Council in 1975 for Morocco to withdraw its occupation forces unconditionally and respect the Sahrawi’s right to self-determination, the UN agreed in 1991 to organize and oversee a referendum whereby voters in the territory could choose between independence or incorporation into Morocco. The UN established a special force, known as MINURSO, to supervise the cease-fire, help with the repatriation of refugees, and make preparations for the plebiscite. Both parties agreed to base the voter rolls on residents tabulated in a 1974 Spanish census and their descendants. However, Morocco has insisted on also including large numbers of Moroccans who could trace their ancestry to Sahrawi tribes, effectively stacking the electorate in favor of incorporation. Meanwhile, Moroccan troops remain in Western Sahara, and any pro-independence political activity is severely repressed. The refugees remain in their Polisario-managed camps in Algeria.
Both France and the United States have blocked the UN from imposing sanctions or putting pressure on the Moroccans to compromise. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, through his special envoy, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, has been engaged in seeking a resolution. Despite Polisario threats to return to war, Algeria–which has undergone serious internal conflict over the past decade–is unlikely to provide military assistance necessary to challenge Moroccan control.
Role of U.S.
The United States, along with France, has been the principal military backer of Morocco in its 25-year occupation of Western Sahara. U.S. counterinsurgency advisers and equipment played a key role in reversing the war in Morocco’s favor in the 1980s. Morocco has long been considered a strategic ally of the West, initially during the cold war as an anticommunist force and more recently as an asset against Islamic militancy. So far, the U.S. has rejected the increasingly moderate and pro-Western tone of the Polisario, though a coalition of liberal and conservative members of Congress has begun to pressure the administration to support Sahrawi self-determination. Successive U.S. administrations have feared that should Morocco lose a fair referendum–a likely scenario–it could mean the downfall of Morocco’s pro-Western monarchy, which has staked its political future on incorporating what it refers to as “the southern provinces.” As a result, although Washington gives lip service to Baker’s mission and related UN efforts and provides a few dozen military and civilian personnel to MINURSO, the U.S. is unlikely to encourage a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Africa’s longest-running and final anticolonial struggle.
Stephen Zunes
Morocco and Western Sahara
Key Points
Morocco has occupied Western Sahara since 1975 in violation of resolutions by the UN Security Council and a decision by the International Court of Justice.
The United States has provided military, economic, and diplomatic support for Morocco’s war effort.
A cease-fire and proposed referendum bring promise for peace in the territory, but U.S. leadership is needed to insure its implementation.
On Africa’s Atlantic coast, at the western extremity of the Arab world, lies Western Sahara, site of Africa’s longest post-colonial conflict. While more than one billion people have been decolonized over the past fifty years, Western Sahara is still recognized by the international community as a “non-self-governing territory,” occupied for more than twenty years by its powerful neighbor, Morocco. Just prior to the scheduled end of Spain’s colonial administration in 1976, the territory—then known as Spanish Sahara—was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania and, within three years, came under exclusive Moroccan control. This occurred despite the landmark October 1975 decision by the International Court of Justice that upheld the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination in the face Morocco’s irredentist claims.
Spain had promised the country independence, but pressure from Morocco and the U.S. forced the Spanish government, in the midst of its own delicate transition to democratic rule, to capitulate. The U.S. was concerned about the prospects of an independent Western Sahara under the Polisario Front, the left-leaning independence movement, and also wished to boost the political fortunes of Morocco’s pro-Western monarch, King Hassan II.
Moroccan forces invaded the territory, but initially suffered heavy losses to the Polisario. Mauritania was defeated outright and withdrew. By 1987, however, due in large part to large-scale American military support, Morocco succeeded in conquering virtually the entire territory, including the former Mauritanian sector. The U.S. blocked enforcement of the 1975 UN Security Council resolution demanding Morocco’s withdrawal and recognizing Western Sahara’s right to national self-determination. The country remains occupied today, with most of the indigenous population, known as Sahrawis, exiled in refugee camps in neighboring Algeria.
There has been a cease-fire in effect since 1991, but the promised UN-supervised referendum on the fate of the territory has yet to take place. The long-running diplomatic stalemate was broken through the efforts of UN Special Envoy and former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in September 1997 in a historic agreement between representatives of Morocco and the Polisario Front. The parties agreed on an identification process for voters and a code of conduct for the long-awaited plebiscite to determine whether the territory becomes independent or is integrated into Morocco.
This breakthrough appears to have come not because of U.S. diplomacy, however, but despite it. And whether the referendum will finally take place as planned or (like previously scheduled votes) will be postponed, due to disputes between Morocco and the Polisario over eligible voters and other logistics, may depend on whether Washington is willing to exert the necessary leadership to pressure its Moroccan ally.
The U.S. and Morocco have a longstanding special relationship. They have had a treaty of friendship since 1787, the longest unbroken peace agreement the U.S. has maintained with any country in the world. Morocco has nearly thirty million people, making it the second largest Arab county, and is rich in mineral resources that may become important to the U.S. in coming years. It is strategically located in the northwest corner of Africa, bordering both the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, and includes the Straits of Gibraltar. Since 1950, Morocco has received more U.S. aid than any other Arab or African country, except for Egypt. Indeed, since the beginning of the war over Western Sahara, Morocco has received more than one-fifth of all U.S. aid to the continent, totaling more than $1 billion in military assistance and $1.3 billion in economic aid.
In return, Morocco has remained one of Washington’s closest strategic allies in either Africa or the Arab world, particularly during the early years of the Reagan administration. Morocco allows the U.S. Navy access to its port facilities and grants the U.S. Air Force landing, refueling, and overflight rights. There has been close binational cooperation in intelligence and communications. Despite a history of close relations with Iraq, Morocco sent forces to Saudi Arabia in 1990 to support the U.S.-led war effort to liberate Kuwait. In addition, the United States and Morocco have cooperated militarily in supporting pro-Western regimes in Africa, and Morocco has engaged in destabilizing efforts against radical African states, with apparent close collaboration with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has been largely silent about the Moroccan government’s ongoing human rights abuses against its own people, and Washington has prodded Morocco to pursue questionable neoliberal economic policies. With the demise of the anticommunist rationale for the cold war, Morocco is now being touted as a bulwark against Islamic extremism and as a model for U.S.-backed economic reforms.
Problems with Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems
U.S. support for Morocco’s invasion and occupation legitimizes territorial aggression, which serves as a dangerous precedent.
The ongoing occupation is a source of political instability both in Morocco and in the region as a whole.
The U.S. has supported an autocratic government in Morocco and is proffering questionable economic priorities.
Both the U.S. refusal to take a strong stand against the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara and the Moroccan government’s ongoing reluctance to cooperate with the UN-mandated referendum establish dangerous precedents and send the wrong signal to potential aggressors elsewhere in the world. The United States organized and launched a devastating war against Iraq in 1991 on the grounds that such territorial conquests would not be tolerated. U.S. acquiescence to Moroccan aggression against its resource-rich southern neighbor not only raises serious questions regarding the actual motivations for the Gulf War, it also represents a dangerous precedent in U.S. foreign policy. Soon after the conquest, Allan Nanes, a specialist in U.S. foreign policy for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, identified the shift in U.S. policy whereby the U.S. “would not automatically reject a territorial transfer brought [about] by force.” Less than a month after Morocco was given the green light in Western Sahara, Indonesia launched a similar—and even more devastating—invasion in East Timor.
Just after Morocco’s invasion, Thomas Frank of the New York University Law School stated before Congress that the invasion “constitutes a particularly destabilizing precedent for Africa and indeed the whole world.” Fifteen years later, perhaps in reward for Morocco’s modest support during the Persian Gulf crisis, Washington back-pedaled on its initial support of the peace agreement when Morocco became recalcitrant soon after signing the accords. According to the Los Angeles Times, “The problems have been exacerbated by the evident unwillingness of the United States to put much pressure on King Hassan.” Indeed, then-Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs John R. Bolton acknowledged that Morocco had been “unhelpful” regarding the UN accords but that Morocco’s role in supporting U.S. foreign policy had to be taken into account in determining the U.S. response.
Despite recommendations by the 1992 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report urging Washington to pressure Morocco to comply with the terms of the accord, the shift in U.S. policy back toward the strong pro-Moroccan position of the Reagan administration was strengthened still further when President Clinton assumed office. As with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Clinton administration appears to have taken a position to the right of its immediate Republican predecessor. Indeed, there appears to have been a conscious shift on the part of President Clinton in favor of permanent Moroccan control over Western Sahara. In November 1995, the United States sponsored a UN Security Council resolution that would have forced the referendum to proceed without Polisario approval, based largely on Moroccan-supported voter rolls. This resolution was withdrawn, however, as a result of vigorous protests from Algeria and South Africa.
Given the leadership role the United States has taken in the United Nations regarding other violators of UN resolutions—such as Iraq, Libya, and Sudan—the apparent acquiescence to Morocco raises serious questions regarding Washington’s commitment to international law and its support of the United Nations as a neutral arbiter of international conflict. As with Israel, the Clinton administration appears quite willing to make exceptions for countries it deems to be strategic allies. In that sense, it seems that little has changed since the end of the cold war, during which the U.S. proved itself quite willing to sacrifice its more idealistic principles regarding international law, self-determination, and human rights for what were viewed as the strategic imperatives of anticommunism. Although communism is no longer a threat, the perceived need to support allied regimes—despite their rejection of both international law and the authority of the United Nations—remains unabated.
On a less global scale, the continued irresolution of the Western Sahara problem contributes to Morocco’s internal instability. Morocco has spent billions of dollars both in supplying tens of thousands of troops along a 1,200-mile berm to keep the Polisario out of the territory and in building and maintaining an infrastructure in a thus-far unsuccessful effort to win the hearts and minds of the remaining Sahrawi population. This drain on resources has exacerbated Morocco’s already-serious economic problems, encouraged dangerous ultranationalist demagoguery, strengthened the political role of the armed forces, and encouraged political repression, all of which contribute to political instability in this important country.
The Western Sahara standoff also constitutes the major obstacle to greater cooperation between the countries of northwestern Africa—known as the Maghreb—and has nearly triggered open warfare between Morocco and the neighboring states of Algeria and Mauritania. Such regional instability, particularly in light of the growing challenge of Islamic radicalism in the region, does not serve U.S. interests.
Meanwhile, U.S. insistence on economic liberalization in Morocco without concomitant political liberalization has only served to encourage political instability and the rise of radical anti-American movements. As in the Persian Gulf region, the United States—itself the product of a republican revolution—finds itself in the awkward position of defending an absolute monarchy against those who strive for a more democratic system. As with previous cases where the U.S. has identified itself with economic policies that disproportionately hurt the poor and with governments that are unpopular and autocratic, the likelihood that a successor regime will be strongly anti-American is greatly enhanced.
Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations
The U.S. should pressure Morocco—possibly employing military and economic sanctions—to comply with UN Security Council resolutions and to proceed with a fair and internationally supervised referendum.
Closer diplomatic relations with the Polisario Front should be established as a means of strengthening the peace process.
The U.S. should encourage both political liberalization and efforts at sustainable and broad-based economic development in Morocco.
The Houston Agreement reiterates and strengthens the key aspects of the original UN settlement: refugee repatriation, troop confinement, release of prisoners, freedom to campaign, access for accredited international observers, equal access by the parties to the media, and UN authority to intervene to insure the fairness of the electoral process. The agreement’s definition of eligible voters appears to be much closer to the Polisario’s assumption of a legalistic territorial meaning than to Morocco’s rather vague ethnic referents. Whether it can actually be implemented remains to be seen.
Since there was an American presence in the thick of the negotiations, the Clinton administration did not feel a great need to interfere. At the same time, the administration did little to support Baker’s efforts. Although State Department and Defense Department officials privately hope for a fair referendum in Morocco’s favor, most realize that an unfair victory by Morocco would be highly problematic and would likely lead to a resumption of the fighting. As a result—unlike the Reagan administration in the 1980s—the U.S. has not tried to sabotage these peace efforts.
Whether the referendum will actually occur may depend on whether the Clinton administration is willing to take the leadership to insure that its Moroccan ally does not once again seek to delay and sabotage the peace process. There is some speculation that the Moroccans actually hope for open American pressure to help blunt the domestic reaction should the referendum not go in Morocco’s favor.
As was the case during the Bush administration, legislators are taking some initiative in the matter through an unusual coalition of liberal and conservative lawmakers from both parties. Congress has passed a resolution supporting a “free, fair, and transparent” referendum “held in the presence of international and domestic observers and international media without administrative or military pressure or interference” where “only genuine Sahrawis, as identified in the method agreed upon by both sides, will take part.” Lawmakers have furthermore requested that the Clinton administration fully support such a referendum process.
This is exactly the position the U.S. government needs to adopt. Washington must be willing to exhibit the same leadership it has shown in other international conflicts to insure that Morocco does not try to back out of the agreement. This might include the threat of military and economic sanctions against Morocco to insure compliance. The willingness of the United States to help guarantee the referendum process could be a litmus test for the credibility of U.S. diplomacy in North Africa and perhaps for the entire world.
A second policy shift that Washington should pursue is closer diplomatic ties with the Polisario Front. Soon after Morocco’s invasion, the Polisario declared an independent state of Western Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), which was subsequently recognized by 75 countries and is a full member of the Organization of African Unity. The U.S. has traditionally avoided close diplomatic contact with Polisario representatives and has pressured a number of countries to withhold recognition. Washington needs to recognize the Polisario as a legitimate actor in the conflict and must fully consider its perspectives in the ongoing peace process. Should Morocco continue to balk at proceeding with a fair referendum, the U.S. should consider establishing full diplomatic relations with the SADR.
Finally, involving Morocco itself, Washington needs to encourage a transition to a greater degree of democracy. Although a parliamentary system is in place, the king still remains an autocratic ruler. The U.S. should urge the release of political prisoners and should encourage a transition toward a more authentic and open democratic system. In addition, while continuing to endorse economic liberalization that challenges official corruption and dubious prestige projects, Washington needs greater sensitivity to the impact of other economic reforms on the large and growing poor segments of Moroccan society. Morocco’s economic growth in recent years has benefited primarily a small minority of the population. Only through a more even and sustainable development program can political and economic stability be enhanced.