The Gaza War, Congress and International Humanitarian Law

The large-scale killing of civilians during Israel’s three-week assault on the Gaza Strip in 2008-09 received widespread condemnation from human-rights advocates and international legal scholars the world over. In both Europe and North America, public reaction to the grossly disproportionate Israeli response to Hamas rocket attacks was the most negative ever expressed against an Israeli military action. In Israel itself, soldiers who had witnesses some of the atrocities joined Israeli peace activists in exposing war crimes committed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). However, the U.S. Congress, under the leadership of the Democratic Party, overwhelmingly defended the Israeli offensive, even to the point of attacking leading defenders of international humanitarian law.

Support for the impending war began months earlier, in June 2008, when 77 senators — including future Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — signed a letter put together by Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Mary Landrieu (D-LA) to President George W. Bush defending Israeli air strikes on the heavily populated Gaza Strip. The letter also urged the Bush administration to block any UN Security Council resolution critical of Israel, claiming that UN opposition to Israeli attacks against crowded urban areas constituted a refusal to “acknowledge Israel’s right to self-defense.” An almost identical letter in the House, drafted by House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD), House Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Howard Berman (D-CA), House Minority Leader Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Representative Ilana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) received 268 signatures. Americans for Peace Now (APN), a liberal Zionist group, warned that these letters were designed to build “a defense, in advance, for a large Israeli military offensive in Gaza.” 1 APN, among others, also noted that such an Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip would likely result in large-scale civilian casualties. In apparent anticipation of such a scenario, the House of Representatives had passed a resolution that March, during an upsurge of fighting between Hamas militiamen and Israeli forces, which claimed, “Those responsible for launching rocket attacks against Israel routinely embed their production facilities and launch sites amongst the Palestinian civilian population, utilizing them as human shields.” The resolution goes on to specifically condemn “the use of innocent Palestinian civilians as human shields by those who carry out rocket and other attacks” and yet again makes note of Palestinians who “continue to be utilized as human shields by terrorist organizations.”2 However, human-rights groups monitoring the situation at that time noted that, while Hamas had failed to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians in the densely populated Gaza Strip, they found no instances of the use of human shields by Hamas.3

Amnesty International condemned Israel’s “reckless disregard for civilian life” in its bombing and shelling of civilian population centers that spring. Its report also noted that the attacks by Palestinians against civilian-populated areas in Israel, which the report also roundly condemned, “[do] not make it legitimate for the Israeli authorities to launch reckless air and artillery strikes which wreak such death and destruction among Palestinian civilians.”4 The goal of the supporters of the House resolution, which gave unqualified support for the Israeli government’s bombing and shelling of the territory, apparently was to convince their constituents that Palestinians themselves — not the Israelis who were attacking them — were responsible for civilian casualties and would be responsible for the far greater number of civilians who would inevitably die as a result of the Israeli invasion that was planned for later that year. There were 265 sponsors of the resolution, which passed by a 404-1 vote (with four voting “present.”) This sent a clear signal to the Israeli government that there would be no opposition in Congress for an even larger military assault against the Palestinian population of the enclave. Congressional support for the upcoming Israeli war against the Gaza Strip went beyond such nonbinding resolutions, however. In apparent anticipation of the long-planned Israeli invasion that was to begin just three months later, Congress voted in September to send 1,000 of the highly sophisticated GBU-39 air-to-ground missiles to Israel, which were heavily utilized in the assault in Gaza.

On November 6, Israel tightened its siege of the Gaza Strip, prompting Human Rights Watch to note, “Israel’s severe limitations on the movement of nonmilitary goods and people into and out of Gaza, including fuel and medical supplies, constitutes collective punishment, also in violation of the laws of war.”5 Despite this, congressional leaders of both parties continued to defend the sanctions. Hamas appeared willing to renew its ceasefire, scheduled to expire the following month, in return for Israel’s lifting of the blockade and ending its periodic raids into Gaza and assassinations of Hamas officials. The Israeli government categorically rejected the idea. Despite the congressional leadership’s support for Israel’s rejection of such efforts to salvage the ceasefire, which could have prevented further rocket attacks into Israel, they subsequently would claim that Israel had “no choice” but to launch its massive assault on the Gaza Strip in retaliation.


On December 27, following an increase in Hamas rocket attacks into populated areas inside Israel, the IDF launched its war on the Gaza Strip. Six days into Israel’s bloody assault, Amnesty International USA sent a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noting its dismay “at the lopsided response by the U.S. government to the recent violence and its lackadaisical efforts to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.” The Nobel Peace Prizewinning organization went on to note, “Without diminishing the responsibility of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups for indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians, the U.S. government must not ignore Israel’s disproportionate response and the longstanding policies which have brought the Gaza Strip to the brink of humanitarian disaster.”6

Democratic congressional leaders joined their Republican counterparts in rushing to the defense of the Bush administration, however. As reports continued to pour in, describing widespread civilian casualties among Palestinians in the Gaza Strip from the Israeli attacks, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) insisted, “When Israel is attacked, the United States must continue to stand strongly with its friend and democratic ally.” Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) stated, “I strongly support Israel’s right to defend its citizens against rocket and mortar attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza.” House Majority Leader Hoyer claimed, “Israel is acting in clear self-defense in response to heinous rocket attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza,” and that Israel has “an unequivocal right” to engage in such military operations. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Berman declared, “Israel has a right, indeed a duty, to defend itself in response to the hundreds of rockets and mortars fired from Gaza over the past week.”7

Such unequivocal support came amid reports of growing civilian casualties from Israeli air strikes taking place nowhere near any legitimate military targets. Still, congressional leaders of both parties insisted that these were all acts of self-defense. These included the missile that struck a group of students leaving the UN-sponsored Gaza Training College in downtown Gaza, the bombing of a mosque during evening prayers, other missile attacks centered in civilian neighborhoods in the crowded refugee camps of Jabalya and Rafah, as well as a series of attacks against the territory’s one university. Scores of other Palestinians who worked in government offices under the Hamas administration but had nothing to do with the firing of rockets into Israel — or any other military function of the Islamist party — had been killed as well.

Yet some members of Congress went so far as to simply deny that large-scale attacks against civilian targets were taking place. For example, Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and its Middle East subcommittee, insisted that, contrary to reports from reputable human-rights groups, international journalists and other eyewitnesses, “The Israeli response has been a series of targeted strikes against Hamas militants, aimed directly at those who are launching the attacks on Israeli civilian population centers” and that “the Israeli military is taking extreme caution to limit civilian casualties.”8

As the international outcry over the civilian death toll from Israel’s assault grew during the second week of fighting, Congress formally went on record in support of President Bush’s position that the Israeli armed forces bore no responsibility for the large and growing numbers of civilian casualties. Shattering hopes that an expanded Democratic congressional majority might lead to a more moderate foreign policy, the resolutions put forward an extreme reinterpretation of international humanitarian law, apparently designed to exonerate nations with superior firepower from any liability for inflicting large-scale civilian casualties.

The Senate resolution,9 primarily written and sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Reid, passed by unanimous consent on a voice vote. Among the 33 cosponsors was 2004 presidential nominee and newly-named chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry (D-MA), who was joined by such otherwise liberal senators as Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Carl Levin (D-MI), Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Barbara Mikulski (D-MD). An even stronger House resolution,10 sponsored by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), passed the House by a lopsided 390-5 roll-call vote (with 22 members voting “present”). Both resolutions placed the blame for the death and destruction exclusively on the Palestinian side and were widely interpreted as rebukes to the international human-rights community and the United Nations, which cited evidence that both Hamas and the Israeli government were engaged in war crimes.

The resolutions favorably quoted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice extensively, as well as Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, regarding responsibility for civilian deaths and the causes of the ongoing battle, indicative of how even in a Democratic-sponsored initiative, these right-wing political leaders were seen as the most authoritative sources of such information on the conflict. Although some analysts referred to the U.S.-backed Gaza war as “a final and eloquent testimony to the complete failure of the neoconservative movement in United States foreign policy,”11 Pelosi, Reid and virtually the entire Democratic membership of Congress decided to ally themselves with this failed ideology of the outgoing Bush administration rather than blaze a new trail of moderation and common sense in anticipation of new leadership in the White House. President-elect Barack Obama had privately expressed his opposition to the war and successfully demanded that Israel end the fighting and withdraw from the Gaza Strip prior to his January 20 inauguration. Pelosi and Reid’s strategy in pushing through these resolutions, therefore, may have been part of an attempt to box in the incoming administration into continuing Bush’s hard-right foreign policy of rejecting fundamental principles of international law in the name of “the war on terror.”

Some of the language in the resolution put forward by Pelosi, Reid and their colleagues even placed the Democratic Party to the right of the Bush administration. For example, while the January 8 UN Security Council resolution, which received the endorsement of Secretary of State Rice and other administration officials, condemned “all acts of violence and terror directed against civilians”12 [emphasis added], the congressional resolution only condemned the violence and terror of Hamas. Indeed, just as the Security Council unanimously passed its resolution stressing the urgency of establishing “an immediate, durable and fully respected cease-fire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza,” Congress immediately weighed in with language apparently designed to prevent one. The Senate and House resolutions called for a ceasefire only on the condition that it would prevent Hamas “from retaining or rebuilding the capability to launch rockets and mortars against Israel.” Given that most of the rockets and mortars used by Hamas were of a rudimentary design made in local machine shops from scrap metal and other easily obtainable materials, and are therefore a capability that cannot be completely eliminated, it appears that this clause was included to make the establishment of a ceasefire more difficult. Emboldened by this strong bipartisan support from the legislative branch of its most important ally, Israel rejected UN terms for a cease-fire and continued the onslaught.

Also on January 8, Israeli forces killed two UN humanitarian aid workers as they were attempting to provide relief supplies, prompting the International Red Cross to release a strongly worded statement noting that the Israeli military had “failed to meet its obligation under international humanitarian law to care for and evacuate the wounded.”13 The Nobel Peace Prize-winning Doctors Without Borders noted that “Palestinian humanitarian aid and health workers have been killed, and hospitals and ambulances have been bombed.”14 In its subsequent resolutions, however, Congress went on record praising Israel for having “facilitated humanitarian aid to Gaza.”

Both resolutions held Hamas solely “responsible for breaking the cease-fire,” despite the scores of minor violations during the months of the ceasefire by both sides. In addition, Israel had launched a major incursion into the Gaza Strip in November, assassinating several Hamas leaders. This led some in the Israeli press to speculate that this was designed to provoke Hamas into not renewing the ceasefire when it expired the following month. While these Israeli provocations could not justify Hamas’ failure to renew the ceasefire and certainly not Hamas’ decision to once again begin firing rockets into civilian-populated areas of Israel — which is universally recognized as a war crime — the language of the resolutions distorts the events leading up to the war. Ironically, despite blaming Hamas exclusively for not renewing the cease-fire, the congressional resolutions also claimed that returning to the terms of that cease-fire agreement “is unacceptable.”

Yet these were by no means the most egregious misrepresentations of the human-rights situation in these Democratic-led congressional initiatives. As with the resolution from the previous summer, the resolutions accused Hamas of “using innocent civilians as human shields.” Subsequent human-rights reports noted that Hamas was guilty of less-severe violations of international humanitarian law, such as not taking all necessary steps it should to prevent civilian casualties by positioning fighters and armaments too close to concentrations of civilians. As human rights investigators acknowledged, however, the nature of urban warfare, particularly in a territory as densely populated as the Gaza Strip, makes the proximity of retreating fighters and their equipment to civilians unavoidable in many cases. This is not the same thing as using human shields, which is defined as deliberately holding civilians against their will as a deterrent from enemy attacks. None of the resolutions’ cosponsors I contacted replied to inquiries as to where and when Hamas ever used human shields by this internationally recognized definition, nor were the subsequent investigations by reputable human-rights organizations able to find any such cases.

As a result, the Democratic sponsors of the House resolution, in order to justify widespread Israeli violations of international humanitarian law, attempted to redefine just what constitutes human shields. The resolution called “on all nations … to condemn Hamas for deliberately embedding its fighters, leaders and weapons in private homes, schools, mosques, hospitals and otherwise using Palestinian civilians as human shields.” However, the fact that a Hamas leader lives in his own private home, attends a neighborhood mosque and seeks admittance to a local hospital does not constitute the use of human shields. Indeed, the vast majority of leaders of most governments and political parties live in private homes in civilian neighborhoods, go to local houses of worship and check into hospitals when sick or injured, along with ordinary civilians. Furthermore, given that the armed wing of Hamas is a militia rather than a standing army, virtually all of its fighters live in private homes and go to neighborhood mosques and local hospitals as well. By effectively declaring every civilian in the territory a human shield, Pelosi and other congressional leaders appear to have advanced a radical and dangerous reinterpretation of international humanitarian law that would allow virtually any government or armed force resisting a foreign invader to be held responsible for the deaths of its own citizens, while the advancing armed force, with its superior air power or long-range artillery, could be held blameless for its large-scale killing of civilians.

It is also important to note that, even if Hamas had used human shields in the legal definition of the term, it still does not absolve Israel from its obligation to avoid civilian casualties. The Geneva Conventions make it clear that, even if one side is shielding itself behind civilians, such a violation “shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians.”15 Similarly, as Human Rights Watch noted, even the presence of armed personnel and weapons near civilian areas “does not release Israel from its obligations to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian property during military operations.”16 Despite claims by some members of Congress to the contrary, Israel’s January 6 attack on the UN school in Gaza, which killed more than 40 civilians, was still a war crime, even if – as the Israelis claim – IDF forces were being fired upon from the vicinity. (Defending this atrocity is comparable to claiming that it would be legitimate for a SWAT team, in order to kill some bank robbers shooting at them, to also kill bank employees and customers being held hostage since the robbers were using them as “human shields.”)

Pelosi’s resolution not only appeared designed to undermine international humanitarian law, it sought to resurrect a fallacy that has long been rejected by Western legal thought. In an effort to absolve Israel for the hundreds of civilian casualties it was inflicting with U.S.-supplied weaponry, the House resolution called on all nations “to lay blame both for the breaking of the calm and for subsequent civilian casualties in Gaza precisely where blame belongs, that is, on Hamas” [emphasis added]. In reality, however wrong — morally, legally and politically — Hamas’ decision not to renew the ceasefire, it simply does not absolve Israel of its responsibility under international humanitarian law for the far greater civilian deaths its armed forces inflicted upon the Palestinians in Gaza. Indeed, it has long been a principle of Western jurisprudence that someone who is the proximate cause of a crime cannot claim innocence simply because of the influence of another party. If one person starts a bar fight, it does not give the other person a legal right to kill him and his buddies. By refuting this centuries-old legal principle, it was, literally, a reactionary piece of legislation.

In support of the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, the House went on record claiming that it constituted Israel’s “right to act in self-defense to protect its citizens against Hamas’ unceasing aggression, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.” In reality, the UN Charter explicitly prohibits nations going to war unless they “first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”17 Israel, with strong bipartisan U.S. support, had long refused even to meet with Hamas or use any other peaceful means to extend the cease-fire, despite Hamas’s apparently willingness to negotiate to bring that about. Furthermore, while Article 51 does allow countries to resist an armed attack, it does not grant any nation the right to engage in such massive and disproportionate warfare against densely populated cities and refugee camps.

Unlike some similar measures in recent years, these two resolutions passed during the fighting in January defending Israel’s war on Gaza were not drafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the influential “pro-Israel” lobby. Nor were they the initiative of right-wing Republican House leaders like John Boehner (R-OH) or his predecessor Tom DeLay (R-TX), as were some previous resolutions supporting Israeli military operations, such as the 2006 resolution defending Israel’s war on Lebanon. The lack of Democratic input on such resolutions when the Republicans were in the majority was sometimes used by Democratic staff members on Capitol Hill to excuse liberal House members for voting in favor of such initiatives. The claim was that, while these Democrats felt obliged to support the resolutions in order to “show support for Israel,” they did not necessarily approve of the hyperbolic wording. These erstwhile liberal Democrats had no such excuses this time, however, since the drafting of these resolutions came out of the offices of Pelosi, Reid and Berman.


In subsequent months, there were a series of detailed investigations of violations of the laws of war by both Israel and Hamas that directly contradicted assertions made by Congress in these resolutions. Among these were reports by Amnesty International,18 Human Rights Watch,19 the National Lawyers Guild20 and the Israeli group B’Tselem.21 Of greatest concern for the U.S. Congress, however, was the mission organized by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), headed by the distinguished South African jurist Richard Goldstone. The Goldstone Commission report cited a series of war crimes by both Hamas militia and Israeli forces, called on both Hamas and the Israeli government to bring to justice those responsible, and recommended that, in the absence of credible investigations by their respective governments, the case be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for possible prosecution.22 Both Hamas and the Israeli government rejected the commission’s findings, each side denying it ever targeted civilian populations and both claiming their actions were in self-defense.

Because the report cited evidence that Israel, the principal U.S. Middle Eastern ally, was also guilty of war crimes, Congress immediately jumped in to discredit the report. Thirty-two senators signed a letter written by Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Johnny Isakson (R-GA) to Secretary of State Clinton attacking what they insisted was a “biased report.” Senator Gillibrand praised the State Department’s efforts to quash the report’s recommendations, claiming that “legitimizing the report sends a dangerous message to countries defending themselves against terrorism.” The letter insisted that any legal action regarding Israeli human-rights abuses must not be taken up in any international forum. These senators instead insisted that, despite the Israeli government’s long history of covering up war crimes by its armed forces, the Israeli justice system should handle the matter internally. The signatories praised what they called “the extraordinary measures taken by the Israel Defense Forces to minimize civilian casualties” and called upon the Obama administration to “denounce the unbalanced nature of this investigation.”23 Among the 32 senators signing the letter were such leading Democratic liberals as Carl Levin (D-MI), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Russ Feingold (D-WI).

That the report examined violations of international humanitarian law by both sides did not alter these senators’ insistence of bias since, according to the letter, “the vast majority of the report focuses on Israel’s conduct, rather than that of Hamas.” The senators failed to note, however, that the ratio of civilian casualties inflicted by the Israelis relative to those inflicted by Hamas was more than 250:1. This would seem to indicate a legitimate reason to focus primarily on Israel. Furthermore, these senators ignored the likelihood that the report’s criticism of Hamas would have likely been longer and harsher had the Israeli government agreed to meet with the commission and allow its members to visit Israel.

These Senate critics insisted that the Goldstone Commission Report ignored how the Israelis supposedly went to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties by dropping leaflets and sending robo-calls to Palestinian homes warning them of impending attacks. In reality, the report examined these claims in detail but concluded that many of the calls and leaflets were sent out too late or were too vague to enable civilians to reach safety. Furthermore, Israeli calls for civilians to flee to downtown Gaza City led those who heeded such advice right into the line of Israeli fire, as when the Israelis attacked with mortars and phosphorous bombs the UN compound and school where hundreds of fleeing residents had sought refuge. The Goldstone Commission report confirmed the conclusions of previous investigations that there were no legitimate military targets in the area. In the House of Representatives, Elliot Engel (D-NY) and Shelley Berkley (D-NV), senior members of the Middle East subcommittee, issued a joint statement claiming the Goldstone Commission report was “biased against Israel.” Even more critical of the report was Gary Ackerman (D-NY), whom the Democrats had recently selected to chair the Mideast subcommittee and to serve as vice-chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. According to Ackerman, “In the self-righteous fantasyland inhabited by the authors, there’s no such thing as terrorism, there’s no such thing as Hamas, [and] there’s no such thing as legitimate self-defense.” In reality, the report refers to “terrorism” (or “terror” or “terrorists”) more than 100 times, mentions Hamas more than 400 times, and fails to even challenge the dubious claim that Israel launched its war on Gaza in self-defense, much less questions the right of self-defense in general. Ackerman even went so far as to claim that the commission believed that “war is like a sporting event or a debate, rather than the most ghastly, destructive, chaotic phenomenon we human beings are capable of creating.”24 In truth, the report goes into graphic detail on the violence, destruction and terror the conflict inflicted on both sides.

When, despite U.S. efforts to block it, the UNHRC voted to forward its recommendations to the UN Security Council, the House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Goldstone’s report as “irredeemably biased.”25 The resolution was sponsored by right-wing Congresswoman Ilana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), but included 202 cosponsors, some of them powerful Democrats: House Foreign Relations Committee chairman Berman, Middle East subcommittee chairman Ackerman, and majority leader Hoyer. The resolution passed by a 344-36 margin, with 22 voting “present.”

Ironically, Justice Goldstone, the report’s principal author and defender, is Jewish, a longtime supporter of Israel, chair of Friends of Hebrew University, president emeritus of the World ORT Jewish school system and the father of an Israeli citizen. Goldstone was also a leading opponent of apartheid in his native South Africa and served as Nelson Mandela’s first appointee to the country’s post-apartheid Supreme Court. He was a principal prosecutor in the war-crimes tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, took a leading role in investigations into corruption in the UN “Oil for Food” program in Iraq, and was also part of investigations into Argentina’s complicity in providing sanctuary for Nazi war criminals. No one in Congress has ever cited a single occasion in any of these cases where they believed Justice Goldstone ever allowed any personal prejudice to interfere with his investigation. He is only accused of bias when his investigation reveals evidence of war crimes by a U.S. ally. For not only does Goldstone not have any bias against Israel, he is arguably the world’s foremost authority on international humanitarian law. For 80 percent of the U.S. Congress to go on record charging that the investigatory and analytical approach of someone with his pedigree is “irredeemably biased” raises two questions: Does Congress believe anybody can be trusted to investigate war crimes? Would Congress ever be willing to acknowledge that violations of international humanitarian law have taken place, at least when committed by a U.S. ally?

Despite the report’s extensive documentation of Hamas assaults on Israeli towns — which it determined constituted war crimes and possible “crimes against humanity” — the original draft resolution insisted that the fact-finding mission “makes no mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks.” At the last minute, the language was altered to state that the UNHRC’s mandate for the fact-finding mission made no mention of Hamas provocations, one of a series of clauses criticizing this original mandate, which called for an investigation of possible Israeli war crimes only. This objection raised in the House resolution was completely moot, however, since Goldstone and his colleagues refused to accept the offer to serve on the commission unless they were allowed to investigate possible war crimes by both sides in the conflict. The House resolution doesn’t mention this, however, and instead implies that the original mandate remained the basis of the report. In reality, even though the report contained over 70 pages detailing a series of violations of the laws of war by Hamas —including rocket attacks into civilian-populated areas of Israel, torture of Palestinian opponents, and the continued holding of kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit — there was no acknowledgement whatsoever in the 1600-word resolution that the initial one-sided mandate had been superseded or that the report criticized the conduct of both sides.

The resolution was unwavering in its attack against Goldstone and his mission. The mission’s report — totaling 575 pages — contains detailed accounts of deadly Israeli attacks against mosques, private homes and businesses nowhere near legitimate military targets, which they described as “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population.” In particular, the report cites 11 incidents in which the IDF engaged in direct attacks against civilians, including cases where people were shot “while they were trying to leave their homes to walk to a safer place, waving white flags.” The House resolution, however, claims that such charges of deliberate Israeli attacks against civilian areas were “sweeping and unsubstantiated.”

Since both the report’s conclusions and most of the particular incidents cited were independently documented in detailed empirical investigations released in previous months by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and B’Tselem, this congressional resolution has been widely interpreted as an attack against the integrity of these reputable human-rights groups as well. In an apparent effort to further discredit the human-rights community, the resolution goes on to claim that the report denies Israel’s right to self-defense, even though there was absolutely nothing in the mission’s findings that in any way questioned Israel’s right to use military force. It simply insisted that neither Israelis nor Palestinians have the right to attack civilians.

There are other clauses in the resolution that take quotes out of context and misrepresent the report to try to make Goldstone and his colleagues appear “irredeemably biased.” For example, one clause in the resolution attacks the credibility of mission member Christine Chinkin, an internationally respected British scholar of international law, feminist jurisprudence, alternative-dispute resolution and human rights. The resolution questions her objectivity by claiming that “before joining the mission, [she] had already declared Israel guilty of committing atrocities in Operation Cast Lead by signing a public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday Times, that called Israel’s actions ‘war crimes.’” In reality, the open letter did not accuse Israel of “atrocities,” but simply noted that Israel’s attacks against the civilian infrastructure of the Gaza Strip were “not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire.” The letter also noted that “the blockade of humanitarian relief, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and preventing access to basic necessities such as food and fuel, are prima facie war crimes.”26 Given that the commonly used legal term prima facie means “on its first appearance,” this open letter was simply a preliminary assessment rather than a case of having “already declared Israel guilty,” as the resolution states. Furthermore, at the time of the letter — written a full two weeks into the fighting — there had already been a series of preliminary reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross documenting probable war crimes by Israeli armed forces, so virtually no one knowledgeable of international humanitarian law could have come to any other conclusion. As a result, Chinkin’s signing of the letter could hardly be considered the kind of ideologically motivated bias that should preclude her participation on an investigative body, particularly since that same letter unequivocally condemned Hamas rocket attacks as well.

The resolution also faults the report for having “repeatedly downplayed or cast doubt upon” claims that Hamas used “human shields” as an attempted deterrence to Israeli attacks. The reason the report challenged those assertions, however, was that — despite following up on a number of Israeli accusations to this effect — they were unable to find any solid evidence to support such claims. Detailed investigations by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch of such accusations during and subsequent to the fighting came to the same conclusion. As with these previous investigations, the Goldstone report determined that there were occasions when Hamas hadn’t taken all necessary precautions to avoid placing civilians in harm’s way, but they found no evidence whatsoever that Hamas had consciously used civilians as shields at any point during the three-week conflict. Despite this, the House resolution makes reference to a supposed “great body of evidence” that Hamas did use human shields. The resolution fails to provide a single example to support this claim, however, other than an alleged statement by one Hamas official, which the mission investigated and eventually concluded was without merit. It appears, then, that the sponsors of the resolution simply fabricated this charge in order to protect Israel from any moral or legal responsibilities for the more than 700 civilian deaths. Interestingly, the report did find extensive evidence, as did Amnesty International, that Israeli forces used Palestinians as human shields during their offensive. Israeli soldiers testifying at hearings held by a private group of Israeli soldiers and veterans confirmed a number of such episodes as well.27 This fact was conveniently left out of the resolution.

In another example of misleading content, the resolution quotes Goldstone as saying, in relation to the mission’s investigation, “If this was a court of law, there would have been nothing proven.” However, no such investigation carried out on behalf of the UNHRC has ever claimed to have obtained evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the normal criterion for proof in a court of law. This does not, however, buttress the House resolution’s insistence that the report was therefore “unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy.” What the fact-finding mission did find was probable cause for criminal investigations into possible war crimes by both Hamas and the Israeli government, which is exactly what Congress was determined to suppress.

Another spurious claim of bias is the resolution’s assertion that “the report usually considered public statements made by Israeli officials not to be credible, while frequently giving uncritical credence to statements taken from what it called the `Gaza authorities’, i.e. the Gaza leadership of Hamas.” In reality, the report shows that the mission did investigate such statements by Israeli officials and evaluated them based upon the evidence. The resolution also fails to mention that, while Hamas officials were willing to meet with the mission, Israeli officials refused, even denying them entrance into Israel. The mission had to fly Israeli victims of Hamas attacks to Geneva at UN expense to interview them. The mission found these Israelis’ testimony credible, took them quite seriously and incorporated them into their findings, which accused Hamas of committing war crimes. Any serious reading of their mission’s report also reveals that they in no way gave “uncritical credence” to statements by Hamas leaders, toward whom the mission was quite critical.

The House resolution goes on to claim that the report’s observation that the Israeli government has “contributed significantly to a political climate in which dissent with the government and its actions . . . is not tolerated” was erroneous. In reality, it has been well-documented — and has been subjected to extensive debate within Israel — that the right-wing government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has interrogated and harassed political activists and suppressed criticism and sources of potential criticism of actions by the Israeli military. Particular targets have been Israeli nongovernmental organizations such as the dissident soldiers’ group Breaking the Silence.28

The House resolution is particularly vehement in its opposition to the report’s recommendation that, should Hamas and Israeli authorities fail to engage in credible investigations and bring those responsible for war crimes to justice, the matter should be referred to the International Criminal Court for possible prosecution. The resolution insists this is unnecessary since Israel “has already launched numerous investigations.” However, Israeli human-rights groups have repeatedly criticized their government’s failure to launch any independent investigations. They have also documented the Israeli government’s refusal to investigate testimony by soldiers of war crimes.29 (At the time of this writing, more than a year after the war, the only indictments for misconduct by Israeli forces during the conflict have been against two soldiers who stole credit cards from a Palestinian home.)

On the one hand, Congress insisted that the issue stay confined to the UN Human Rights Council. On the other hand, Congress has repeatedly attacked that body as being “anti-Israel.” There is a reason for this apparent contradiction: If the matter were taken to the UN Security Council, as the Goldstone Commission recommended, it would place debate on violations of international humanitarian law by a key U.S. ally before a body that, unlike the UNHRC, has an enforcement mechanism. It would also allow far greater media exposure of Israeli war crimes, the bulk of which were implemented using U.S. weapons systems and ordnance. And, since neither Israel nor Hamas is a party to the ICC convention, Israelis and Palestinians suspected of war crimes could not face justice at the ICC unless it was authorized by the Security Council. The apparent intent, then, was to allow such war criminals to escape prosecution. When Goldstone presented his report before the UNHRC, he noted, “A culture of impunity in the region has existed for too long. The lack of accountability for war crimes and possible crimes against humanity has reached a crisis point.”30 In passing this resolution, the U.S. Congress demonstrated its role in making this culture of impunity and lack of accountability possible.

Indeed, the resolution calls on the Obama administration not only “to oppose unequivocally any endorsement” of the report, but even to oppose unequivocally any “further consideration” of the report in international forums. Instead of debating its merits, therefore, Congress decided to prejudge its contents and disregard the actual evidence put forward. The resolution even goes so far as to claim that Goldstone’s report is part of an effort “to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel and deny it the right to defend its citizens, and that its existence can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the same right.” This sort of demagoguery is based on the premise that documenting a given country’s war crimes is tantamount to denying that country’s right to self-defense and its right to exist, and therefore appears to be aimed at silencing defenders of international humanitarian law anywhere. The fact that such an overwhelming majority of the House voted in favor of this resolution strongly suggests that both political parties now effectively embrace the neoconservative agenda to delegitimize any serious discussion of international humanitarian law in relation to conduct by the United States and its allies.

Indeed, having 80 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives go on record attacking the integrity of one of the world’s most respected and principled defenders of human rights is indicative of just how far to the right the U.S. Congress has now moved, even under Democratic leadership. Congress has served notice to the human-rights community that they won’t consider any human-rights defenders credible if they dare raise questions about the conduct of a U.S. ally. This may actually be the underlying purpose of the resolution: to jettison any consideration of international humanitarian law from policy debates in Washington. The cost, however, will likely be to further isolate the United States from the rest of the world, just as Obama was beginning to rebuild the trust of other nations.


Even putting aside moral and legal concerns, one might think that, following the congressionally authorized and funded debacle in Iraq, Congress would think twice before giving such a wholehearted endorsement to a similarly misguided policy. As Americans know all too well from the Iraq experience, placing an Arab land under debilitating sanctions that punish the population as a whole, bombarding heavily populated civilian areas resulting in widespread casualties among innocent people, and invading and occupying territories with a long history of resistance to outsiders does not lead to greater moderation from those afflicted. Furthermore, one might think that those sincerely concerned with Israel’s legitimate security interests would recognize that Israel’s war against Hamas would not likely induce more rational or compromising policies from the Palestinian side, just as the firing of rockets by Hamas into Israel has certainly not made the Israelis more accommodating.

Indeed, there appears to be little popular support within the United States for such an unqualified endorsement of Israeli war-making, particularly when it results in such high civilian casualties. Public opinion toward the massive Israeli assault on Gaza was particularly negative among Democrats, who have generally been supportive of international humanitarian law, even when violated by U.S. allies. Within the American Jewish community itself, there has never been so much dissent over Washington’s support for Israel’s militaristic and self-defeating policies toward the Palestinians. Despite the myth that it is somehow “political suicide” to oppose such resolutions, all the Democrats who failed to vote for the July 2006 House resolution supporting Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip were re-elected that November by a bigger margin than they had been two years earlier. Furthermore, virtually all of the principal authors and sponsors of these 2009 resolutions come from safe districts.

While the role of AIPAC and other right-wing Zionist groups was certainly a factor, the primary motivation for the resolution appears to have been to prevent the precedent of an impartial investigation into violations of international humanitarian law resulting in the prosecution of war criminals before the International Criminal Court. Since the ICC has never indicted anyone from a country with a record of fair and comprehensive internal investigations of war crimes and prosecution of those believed responsible, the goal of Congress appears to be to protect war criminals from prosecution. U.S. support for human terrorism.” By essentially going on record rights and international law has always that mass killing of civilians is legitimate been uneven, but never has Congress gone as long as you are fighting “terrorists,” this on record by such an overwhelming margin provides a blank check for U.S. forces to to discredit these universal principles so commit future atrocities. This is George W. categorically. Indeed, it may be a means Bush’s foreign-policy legacy. And through of preventing the kind of precedent that these resolutions, it appears that most memcould serve as a deterrent to subsequent bers of the Democratic Party, no less than violations of international humanitarian law their Republican counterparts, have now by the United States in its “global war on embraced this dangerous world view.

1 “Landrieu-Collins/Hoyer-Blunt-Berman-Ros-Lehtinen Letters,” APN Legislative Round-Up, Americans for Peace Now, June 6, 2008.

2 House Resolution 951, 110th Congress, 2nd session, March 5, 2008.
3 Interview, Joe Stork, Middle East division, Human Rights Watch, June 18, 2008.

4 “Children and Civilian Bystanders in Gaza Death Toll,” Amnesty International, March 3, 2008.

5 “Israel/Gaza: Civilians Must Not Be Targets,”Human Rights Watch, December 30, 2008.

6 Letter, Curt Goering, Senior Deputy Executive Director, Amnesty International, to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, January 2, 2009.

7 Memo, “America Supports Israel’s Defensive Actions,” American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Dec. 29, 2008.

8 Alert, “American Leaders Speak Out in Support of Israel’s Right to Self-Defense,” AIPAC, Jan. 22, 2009.

9 Senate Resolution 10, 111th Congress, 1st session, January 8, 2009.

10 House Resolution 34, 111th Congress, 1st session, January 9, 2009.

11 Juan Cole, “Neoconservatism Dies in Gaza,” Salon, January 8, 2009.

12 United Nations Security Council 1860 (2009), January 8, 2009.

13 News Release, “Gaza: ICRC Demands Urgent Access to Wounded As Israeli Army Fails to Assist Wounded Palestinians,” International Committee of the Red Cross, January 8, 2009.

14 Press Release, “Temporary Halt to Gaza Bombing a Paltry Response as Extreme Violence Victimizes Civilians,” Doctors Without Borders, January 7, 2009.

15 Protocol I, Geneva Conventions, Part IV, Section 1, Chapter 1, Article 51.

16 “Lebanon/Israel: Israel Must Allow Civilians Safe Passage,” Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2006.

17 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, Article 33.

18 “Operation ‘Cast Lead’: 22 Days of Death and Destruction,” Amnesty International, July 2, 2009.

19 See, for example, “Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza,” Human Rights Watch, March 25, 2009.

20 “Onslaught: Israel’s Attack on Gaza and the Rule of Law,” National Lawyers Guild, February 2009.

21 “B’Tselem’s Investigation of Fatalities in Operation Cast Lead,” B’Tselem, September 9, 2009.

22 “Human Rights in Palestine and the Other Occupied Arab Territories,” Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 September 2009.

23 Press Release, Office of Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, “Gillibrand, Senate Colleagues Urge U.S. to Block Inflammatory Anti-Israel Report from Reaching U.N. Security Council,” September 29, 2009.

24 Press Release, “Legislators Reject Biased U.N. Report on Israel,” Sept. 18, 2009.

25 House Resolution 867, 111th Congress, 1st session, Nov. 3, 2009.

26 “Israel’s Bombardment of Gaza Is Not Self-Defence,” The Sunday Times, January 11, 2009.

27 Breaking the Silence, “Soldiers Testimonies from Operation Cast Lead, Gaza 2009,” pp. 6-8.

28 Press Release, “Don’t Silence ‘Breaking the Silence,’” B’Tselem, August 2, 2009.

29 See, for example, B’Tselem, “Israeli Human Rights Organizations Call on the Attorney General: ‘Stop Whitewashing Suspected Crimes in Gaza,’” March 19, 2009.

30 United Nations, “Gaza Report Presented to Human Rights Council,” September 29, 2009.

The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel

The United States aid relationship with Israel is unlike any other in the world, or indeed, like any in history. In sheer volume, the amount of aid is the most generous foreign aid program ever between any two countries, totaling $77.726 billion through fiscal year 1996.Foot note 2_1 No country has ever received as much Congressionally-mandated aid as has Israel, including South Vietnam. Indeed, Israel receives more U.S. aid per capita annually than the total annual GNP per capita of several Arab states, including Egypt, Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen and Morocco.Foot note 2_2 What is perhaps even more unusual is that Israel, like its benefactor, is an advanced, industrialized, technologically-sophisticated country, as well as a major arms exporter.

This paper examines the nature and extent of U.S. foreign aid to Israel, the strategic roots of such a policy, how the relationship has been affected by the changing world order, the aid policy of the Clinton Administration, its military component, its impact on Israel, the debate within both Israel and the United States, and the impact of aid on the Middle East peace process.

The Nature of U.S. Aid

U.S. aid to Israel began in the early 1950s with small grants and expanded modestly over the next decade to include Export-Import Bank loans, Food for Peace aid and general economic loans. Military loans began only after the 1967. These were replaced by grants exclusively in 1985. U.S. economic aid increased greatly in subsequent years and grants replaced loans for economic assistance in 1981. In recent years, the annual U.S. subsidy for Israel has remained at approximately $3 billion in military and economic grants, in addition to more than $500 million from other parts of the budget or off-budget.Foot note 2_3 Unlike most U.S. recipients of economic aid, which are required to use the bulk of the money for specific projects, such as buying certain U.S. agricultural surpluses or finished goods, most U.S. aid to Israel goes directly into the government’s treasury to use as they will. In every other country, officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development officials oversee the actual programs, either administered directly, through non-governmental organizations, or under co-sponsorship with a government agency. Since 1971, however, Israel has been the exception: the U.S. government sets the funding level and these become simply cash transfers to the Israeli government.Foot note 2_4
Since 1992, the U.S. has loaned Israel an additional $2 billion annually. Congressional researchers have disclosed that between 1974 and 1989, $16.4 billion in U.S. military loans were converted to grants and that this was the understanding from the beginning. Indeed, all past U.S. loans to Israel have eventually been forgiven by Congress, which has undoubtedly helped Israel’s often-touted claim that they have never defaulted on a U.S. government loan. U.S. policy since 1984 has been that economic assistance to Israel must equal or exceed Israel’s annual debt repayment to the United States.

Unlike other countries, which receive aid in quarterly installments, aid to Israel since 1982 has been given in a lump sum at the beginning of the fiscal year, leaving the U.S. government to borrow from future revenues. Israel even lends some of this money back through U.S. treasury bills and collects the additional interest. This special arrangement costs the U.S. government approximately $50 million each year.Foot note 2_5

In addition, there is the more than $1.5 billion in private U.S. funds which go to Israel annually, in the form of $1 billion in private tax deductible donations and $500 million in Israeli bonds.Foot note 2_6 The ability of Americans to make what amounts to tax-deductible contributions to a foreign government, made possible through a number of Jewish charities, does not exist with any other country. Nor do these figures include short and long-term commercial loans from U.S. banks, which have been as high as $1 billion annually in recent years.Foot note 2_7

The total U.S. aid to Israel is approximately one-third of the foreign aid budget, even though Israel consists of just .001% of the world’s population, and already has one of the world’s higher per capita incomes. Indeed, Israel’s GNP is higher than the combined GNP of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. With a per capita income about $14,000, Israel ranks as the sixteenth wealthiest country in the world; Israelis enjoy a higher per capita than oil-rich Saudi Arabia and are only slightly less well-off than most Western European countries. AID does not even carry the pretense that economic aid to Israel is development assistance, instead utilizing the term «economic support funding.»Foot note 2_8 Given Israel’s relative prosperity, U.S. aid to Israel is becoming increasingly controversial. Indeed, as Yossi Bellen, deputy foreign minister of Israel and a Knesset member, told the Women’s International Zionist organization in 1994, «If our economic situation is better than in many of your countries, how can we go on asking for your charity?»Foot note 2_9

The Roots of U.S. Aid Policy

The U.S. commitment to Israel has often been articulated by American officials in moral terms, even presenting the issue as a case of a democracy battling for its very survival. Yet, were this actually the primary motivation for the U.S. aid program, U.S. aid to Israel would have been highest in the early years of the existence of the Jewish state, when its democratic institutions were strongest and its strategic situation most vulnerable, and would have declined as its military power grew dramatically and its repression against Palestinians in the occupied territories increased. Instead, the trend has been in just the opposite direction: major U.S. military and economic aid did not begin until after the 1967 War. Indeed, 99% of U.S. military assistance to Israel since its establishment came only after Israel proved itself to be far stronger than any combination of Arab armies and after Israeli occupation forces became the rulers of a large Palestinian population.
In the hypothetical event that all U.S. aid to Israel were immediately cut off, it would be many years before Israel would be under significantly greater military threat than it is today. Israel has both a major domestic arms industry and an existing military force far more capable and powerful than any conceivable combination of opposing forces. While a cutoff of economic support may force Israel to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians which would end the expensive patchwork of Israeli control and subsidization of settlements, thereby increasing the likelihood of Palestinian statehood alongside Israel, there would be no question of Israel’s survival being at risk militarily in the foreseeable future.

One of the most fundamental principles in the theory of international relations is that the most stable military relationship between adversaries (besides disarmament) is strategic parity. Such a relationship provides an effective deterrent for both sides against the other launching a pre-emptive attack. If the United States was concerned simply with Israel’s security, the U.S. would be dedicated to maintaining Israeli defenses to the point where they would be approximately equal to any combination of Arab armed forces. Instead, leaders of both American political parties have called not for the U.S. to help maintain a military balance between Israel and its neighbors, but for insuring qualitative Israeli military superiority.Foot note 2_10 When Israel was less dominant militarily, there was no such consensus for U.S. backing of Israel. The continued high levels of U.S. aid to Israel does not likely come out of concern for Israel’s survival. One explanation may come from a desire for Israel to continue its political dominion of the Palestinians and its military dominance of the region.

Indeed, the primary reason for the direction of U.S. policy is the role Israel plays for the United States. Israel has successfully prevented victories by radical nationalist movements in Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen, as well as in Palestine. They have kept Syria, for many years an ally of the Soviet Union, in check. Their air force is predominant throughout the region. Israel’s frequent wars have provided battlefield testing for American arms, often against Soviet weapons. They have been a conduit for U.S. arms to regimes and movements too unpopular in the United States for openly granting direct military assistance, such as South Africa, Iran, Guatemala, and the Nicaraguan Contras. Israeli military advisors have assisted the Contras, the Salvadoran junta, and other movements and governments backed by the United States. The Mossad has cooperated with the CIA and other U.S. intelligence services in intelligence gathering and covert operations. Israel has missiles capable of reaching the former Soviet Union and has cooperated with the U.S. military-industrial complex with research and development for new jet fighters, anti-missile defense systems, and even the Strategic Defense Initiative, a relationship which is expected to continue.Foot note 2_11 As one Israeli analyst described it during the Iran-Contra scandal, «It’s like Israel has become just another federal agency, one that’s convenient to use when you want something done quietly.»Foot note 2_12

The pattern of U.S. aid to Israel is revealing. Immediately following Israel’s spectacular victory in the 1967 war, when it demonstrated its military superiority in the region, U.S. aid shot up by 450%. Part of this increase, according to the New York Times, was apparently related to Israel’s willingness to provide the U.S. with examples of new Soviet weapons captured during the war.Foot note 2_13 Following the 1970-71 civil war in Jordan, when Israel’s potential to curb revolutionary movements outside its borders became apparent, aid increased another sevenfold. After attacking Arab armies in the 1973 War were successfully countered by the largest U.S. airlift in history, with Israel demonstrating its power to defeat surprisingly strong Soviet-supplied forces, military aid increased by another 800%. These increases paralleled the British decision to withdraw its forces from «east of the Suez,» which also led to the massive arms sales and logistical cooperation with the Shah’s Iran, a key component of the Nixon Doctrine.Foot note 2_14

Aid quadrupled again in 1979 soon after the fall of the Shah, the election of the right-wing Likud government, and the ratification of the Camp David Treaty. Aid increased yet again soon after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In 1983 and 1984, when the United States and Israel signed memoranda of understanding on strategic cooperation and military planning and conducted their first joint naval and air military exercises, Israel was rewarded by an additional $1.5 billion in economic aid, as well as another half million dollars for the development of a new jet fighter.Foot note 2_15 During and immediately after the Gulf War, U.S. aid increased an additional $650 million.Foot note 2_16

The correlation is clear: the stronger, more aggressive, and more willing to cooperate with U.S. interests that Israel becomes, the higher the level of aid.

Policy Debates

In reality, the history of unconditional U.S. aid to Israel is not that unfamiliar: they are a result of the same kind of thinking that has guided U.S. policy elsewhere. As Ron Young, in his study Missed Opportunities for Peace, observes, the same world view — an emphasis on military solutions to political problems, the underestimation of the power of popular movements, the tendency to take an exaggerated East-West perspective, and the insistence on unilateral initiatives — has dominated U.S. policy towards Israel and the Middle East as well.Foot note 2_17 The perception of Middle East exceptionalism in U.S. foreign policy has made the widespread dissemination and discussion of critiques of that policy even more difficult than on other issues.
Traditionally, there has been a division among foreign policy elites regarding the wisdom of such large scale and unconditional support for the Israeli government. One group, often referred to as the «State Department Arabists,» believed that the Arab world has much more to offer the United States strategically and economically than does Israel. Support of a militant Israel, they argued, could lead to strong anti-American sentiment in the Arab world and increasing instability in the region. The other faction, which has traditionally been dominant, is that Israel is sufficiently strong militarily to play a stabilizing role. Furthermore, whatever the resentment from the Arab masses, there is little political pluralism in the Arab world to worry about, and most Arab leaders — due to their investment of petrodollars in the West, recognition of Western military power, or general conservatism — can forgive the U.S. for its support of Israel. By blaming the «Jewish lobby» for Washington’s hostile position towards the Arab world rather than American leaders, they can absolve the U.S. government of its responsibility. Indeed, since Israel is a status quo power whose interests often coincide with theirs, a strong Israel can actually be to their advantage, not just because it offers protection against radical challenges from within and from without, but it serves as a useful diversion for popular dissatisfaction with their own leadership.

During the first twenty years following Israel’s victory in the 1967 war, this latter tendency dominated U.S. foreign policy makers, particularly during the Reagan Administration. Indeed, most of the Arabists were purged or retired by the 1980’s. However, the intifada led to a slight shift in perceptions, as the inability of Israeli military might to curb popular resistance in the occupied territories and the dangerous precedent it set for possible insurrections against pro-Western Arab leaders, led to a re-evaluation of the role of the Israeli military as a stabilizing force. Combined with the end of the Cold War, which lessened the need for Israel as a major link in the «strategic consensus» against possible Soviet penetration in the Middle East, the Palestinian intifada resulted in the Bush Administration challenging Israeli policies to a degree unheard in Washington for more than a generation. These protests were in rhetoric only — unconditional military and economic aid to the Israeli government continued to flow — but it did indicate something of a more balanced policy.

In addition, the dramatic increase in military cooperation and arms transfers to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) during and after the Gulf War demonstrated that Israel was not the only country on which the United States relied to maintain its interests in the region. However, it soon became clear that the potentially unstable Gulf monarchies, still suspicious of U.S. intentions and lacking the advantages of Israel in terms of well-trained forces, technological sophistication, and ability to mobilize their human and material resources, could never be a substitute for the U.S. alliance with Israel.

Rather than being a liability, the Gulf War proved Israel once again to be a strategic asset: Israeli developments in air- to-ground warfare were integrated into allied bombing against Iraqi missile sites and other targets; Israeli-designed conformal fuel tanks for F-15 fighter-bombers greatly enhanced their range; the Israeli-provided mine plows were utilized during the final assaults on Iraqi positions; Israeli mobile bridges were used by U.S. Marines; Israeli targeting systems and low-altitude warning devises were utilized by American helicopters; and, Israel developed key components for the widely-used Tomahawk missiles. It served as yet another reminder of how Israel remains, in the eyes of American policy makers, an important strategic ally. Given that continued support of Israel — despite its ongoing, and indeed, worsening, repression of the Palestinians — did not interfere with an unprecedented degree of cooperation with Egypt and the Gulf monarchies or with rapprochement with Syria, showed few risks are involved with the U.S. continuing such an alliance.

With the weakening of the intifada, the triumph by the U.S. and its allied pro-western monarchies in the Gulf War, and the election of a more moderate — and thereby less provocative –government in Israel, the odds of major political instability resulting from unconditional support of Israel decreased. As a result, the U.S. felt more confident in throwing its unqualified backing of Israeli policies and increasing still further the level of aid, particularly when Bill Clinton assumed office in 1993.

Clinton and U.S. Aid

Under the Clinton Administration, the strategic relationship has strengthened still further. This comes in part because Israel’s role as a surrogate for U.S. strategic interests has never been limited to concerns over Soviet influence. As in many other parts of the Third World, the Cold War was more the excuse than the actual reasons for U.S. concerns over instability and challenges to U.S. economic and political hegemony. Indeed, radical nationalism and — more recently — extremist Islamic forces have been seen by American policy makers as at least as threatening to American interests in the region as was Communism, and Israeli support in challenging such perceived threats to American hegemony has always been, and will continue to be, quite welcome.
A somewhat revealing episode is in Clinton’s attitude towards the controversial $10 billion loan guarantee. During the 1992 campaign, Clinton attacked Bush from the right, criticizing his insistence that the loan guarantee be linked to curbing the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories or that it be withheld until after the Israeli elections in June, a position which many Israelis interpreted as an endorsement of the Likud. Feeling heat from Clinton, by this point the Democratic presidential nominee, Bush approved the loans in August, despite a lack of Israeli assurance that they would halt settlement activity. Though Clinton claimed that the loans would be used as housing for Jewish immigrants, none of the money was used for such purposes; indeed, Israel had thousands of unoccupied housing units, particularly in Beersheva, where most refugees were initially settled.Foot note 2_18 The Israeli government acknowledged that the loans were more of a cushion than anything vital to the economy.Foot note 2_19

Congress attached a provision which required that the president deduct the costs of additional settlement activity from the $2 billion annual installment of the loan. In October 1993, the U.S. officially announced to Israel that there would be a $437 million deduction in the next year’s loan due to settlement construction during the 1993 fiscal year. However, State Department Middle East peace talks coordinator Dennis Ross immediately let the Israeli government know that the U.S. would find a way to restore the full funding. Within a month, Clinton authorized Israel to draw an additional $500 million in U.S. military supplies from NATO warehouses in Europe. A similar scenario unfolded the following year: after deducting $311.8 million on settlements from 1995 loans, Clinton authorized $95.8 from redeploying troops from GazaFoot note 2_20 and $240 million to facilitate withdrawal from West Bank cities, based on the highly-controversial assertion that it cost more to withdraw troops than to maintain them in hostile urban areas.Foot note 2_21

Indeed, Clinton has explicitly promised the Israelis that aid would remain constant regardless of Israeli settlement policies.Foot note 2_22 What has resulted, then, is that the United States is now effectively subsidizing the settlements directly, since the Israelis know they will be compensated for every dollar (and more) that they contribute to maintaining their presence in the West Bank, despite the fact that all of those settlements are illegal, according to Article 49 of the Geneva Convention which bans occupying powers from transferring parts of their own civilian population into the territory taken by military force.

Indeed, United Nations Security Council resolution 446 — adopted unanimously with U.S. support — specifically requires Israel to withdraw from those settlements unconditionally, as well as resolution 465, which forbids any country from supporting Israel’s colonization drive. Using U.S. aid to undermine United Nations Security Council resolutions is in sharp contrast to the U.S. insistence that the international community maintain strict sanctions against Arab states, such as Iraq, Libya and Sudan, for their violations of other U.N. resolutions.

Republicans in Congress, despite their fiscal conservatism and opposition to most other forms of foreign, are similarly munificent regarding aid to Israel. House Speaker Newt Gingrich has been longstanding supporter of unconditional aid to Israel; indeed, his wife Marianne earns $2500 month plus commissions by a corporation to lobby U.S. companies to invest in Israel. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms insists that cutting U.S. aid to Israel is «off the table» and Senate majority leader Bob Dole has also opposed any aid cutbacks.Foot note 2_23

Arms Transfers Continue

Contrary to many predictions, the end of the Cold War and the significant advances in the Middle East peace process has not lessened U.S. military and economic aid to Israel. U.S. aid to Israel is higher now than twenty years ago, when Egypt’s massive and well-equipped armed forces threatened war, when Syria’s military was expanding rapidly with advanced Soviet weaponry, when armed factions of the PLO were launching terrorists attacks into Israel, when Jordan still claimed the West Bank and stationed large numbers of troops along its lengthy border and demarcation line with Israel, and when Iraq was embarking upon vast program of militarization. Now, with a longstanding peace treaty with Egypt and a large demilitarized and internationally-monitored buffer zone, with ongoing peace talks with a gradually demilitarizing Syria weakened by the collapse of its Soviet patron, with the PLO cooperating closely with Israeli security, with Jordan signing a peace treaty with full normalized relations and Iraq’s armed forces devastated during the Gulf War and under strict international sanctions and subsequent monitoring, why do such high levels of aid continue?
Noteworthy is the often-repeated insistence by the Clinton Administration and leaders of both American political parties that aid to Israel should be «kept at current levels.» If the real interest was in providing adequate support for Israeli defense, these officials would instead be referring to «maintaining adequate aid to maintain Israel’s security needs,» which presumably would be declining as the peace process moves forward. However, Israel’s actual defense needs are not the issue.

Matti Peled, the late Israeli major general and Knesset member, reported that as far as he can tell, the $1.8 billion figure for annual military support was arrived at «out of thin air.»Foot note 2_24 Such a figure is far more than Israel needs to replenish stocks, is not apparently related directly to any specific security requirements, and has remained relatively constant in recent years, thereby reenforcing the impression that it is little more than a U.S. government subsidy for American arms manufacturers. This benefit to American defense contractors is multiplied by the fact that every major arms transfer to Israel creates a new demand by Arab states — most of which can pay hard currency through petrodollars — for additional American weapons to challenge Israel. Indeed, Israel announced its acceptance of a Middle Eastern arms freeze in 1991, but the United States effectively blocked it.

In 1993, when 78 Senators wrote President Clinton insisting that aid to Israel be continued at the current levels, they justified it on the grounds of massive arms procurement by Arabs states, neglecting to note that 80% of those arms transfers were of U.S. origin. Were they really concerned about Israeli security, they would have voted to block these arms transfers to the Gulf monarchies. Yet this was clearly not their purpose. Even Israel did not actively oppose the sale of 72 highly-sophisticated F-15E jet fighters to Saudi Arabia in 1992, since the Bush Administration offered yet another increase in U.S. arms transfers to Israel in return for Israeli acquiescence.Foot note 2_25

In many respects, U.S. aid policy serves the interests of both well. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States all share an interest in curbing radical nationalism and preserving the regional status quo — if deemed necessary, by military force.

In addition, for the Israelis, Arab militarism serves as an excuse for continued repression in the occupied territories and resistance to demands for territorial compromise. For autocratic Arab leaders, Israeli military power serves as an excuse for their lack of internal democracy and inability to address badly needed social and economic reforms. It is noteworthy that for many years up until 1993, U.S. was sending billions of dollars to Gulf states, which took a harder line towards Israel than the PLO, while at the same time refusing to even talk with the Palestinians.

The resulting arms race has been a bonanza for U.S. arms manufacturers, which may actually be a major explanation for U.S. aid policy. For while the pro-Israel political action committees (PACs) certainly wield substantial clout with their contributions to Congressional candidates supportive of large-scale military and economic aid to Israel, the Aerospace Industry Association –which promotes massive arms transfers to the Middle East and elsewhere — is even more influential, contributing more than $7.4 million in each of the most recent two election cycles,Foot note 2_26 and provides the additional inducement of creating jobs and bringing federal dollars into key states and Congressional districts. Indeed, the Clinton Administration has showed no qualms about continued aid to Morocco, despite its ongoing occupation of Western Sahara, and to Indonesia, despite its continuing occupation of East Timor. Like Israel, these U.S. allies, all serious human rights violators, continue to occupy neighboring states in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions, yet the Clinton Administration — like its predecessors — has rejected linking aid to these countries for their compliance with international norms, even without the support of a strong domestic lobby.

Impact of Aid to Israel

The large amounts of U.S. aid to the Israeli government has not been as beneficial to Israel as many would suspect. Most of the economic assistance has gone primarily to finance non-productive sectors, such as the settlements in the occupied territories and the military, as well as to finance loan repayments to American banks. Indeed, each fiscal year since 1974, approximately $1 billion of Israel’s $1.2 billion in Economic Support Funds has been used to cover the interest and principle due from previous U.S. loans, which were borrowed primarily to finance arms purchases from the U.S.Foot note 2_27 In addition, the $1.8 billion in annual military aid is in fact simply a credit line to American arms manufacturers, and actually ends up costing Israel two to three times that amount to train operators, to staff and maintain, to procure spare parts, and other related costs.Foot note 2_28 The overall impact is to increase Israeli economic and military dependency on the United States and to drain Israel’s fragile economy,Foot note 2_29 taking money away from Israel’s once-generous social welfare system.
Ezra Sohar has observed how, unlike borrowing money to build a factory, borrowing money for armaments does not produce profits or create the ripple effect or ancillary industries that strengthens the overall economy.Foot note 2_30 Until the 1967 War, when Israeli military spending averaged a little over 8% of the GNP, Israel’s annual growth rate posted a healthy 9%. When military spending dramatically escalated with an enormous increase in procurement of U.S. weapons, at times reaching as much as 35% of GNP, the economy faltered. Currently, military spending is slightly under 20% of the GNP, and the economy is still struggling.Foot note 2_31

Some critics from the right, particularly those calling for a liberalization of the Israeli economy, have started calling for the reduction or elimination of economic aid. Arnon Gafny, the former governor of the Bank of Israel, argues that U.S. aid had impaired the country’s long-term competitiveness. Similarly, Moshe Syrquin of Bar-Ilan University notes how the Israeli economy went downhill with the dramatic upsurge of U.S. aid in the early 1970s.Foot note 2_32 Even the selling of Israeli bonds in now questioned: According to Joel Bainerman, editor of Tel Aviv Business, argues that instead of the old slogan «Investing in Israel’s Future, it should be «building a bigger debt for Israel.» Including interest, the Israeli government currently owes bondholders $6 billion; interest rates are well above similar bonds in U.S. As a result, less bonds are purchased by committed Zionists and increasing amounts are bought up by international banks, financial institutions, pension funds, and state and local government agencies in U.S.Foot note 2_33

Says Bainerman, «The end of foreign aid would not only improve the chances of reforming Israel’s over-centralized economy, in which subsidies play an important part, but increase the chances for political reform as well.»Foot note 2_34 In the United States, such sentiment is not only echoed among traditional conservative critics of Israel, but even the staunchly pro-Israeli New Republic has cited how US aid has «retarded free enterprise by supporting subsidies and monopolies for favored constituencies.»Foot note 2_35

Some left-wing Israelis argue just the opposite: that the United States is using its aid weapon to pressure the Israeli government to weaken the Histradut (Israel’s powerful trade union federation), privatize state-controlled enterprises, cut social services, and lower taxes.Foot note 2_36 Such economic restructuring has been a requirement for U.S.-backed loans to a number of countries as a means of creating a more favorable climate for U.S. investment, so it should not be surprising that Israel should be held to such standards as well. Indeed, State Department officials admit that U.S. aid is used as a leverage to encourage greater privatization and that the U.S. officials routinely give advice on long-term macro-economic planning.Foot note 2_37 However, given that AID support goes directly into the Israeli treasury with few restrictions, it is unclear just how this pressure is applied.

Yet the dissent from the left regarding U.S. aid goes far deeper. First of all, the failure of the United States to use aid as leverage is seen as effectively sabotaging the efforts of peace activists in Israel to change Israeli policy, which Peled referred to as pushing Israel «toward a posture of calloused intransigence.»Foot note 2_38 In the Israeli press, one can find comments like those in Yediot Ahronot which describes their country as «the Godfather’s messenger,» since Israel undertakes the «dirty work» of the Godfather, who «always tries to appear to be the owner of some large respectable business.»Foot note 2_39 Israeli satirist B. Michael describes U.S. aid to Israel as a situation where «My master gives me food to eat and I bite those whom he tells me to bite. It’s called strategic cooperation.»Foot note 2_40 Indeed, Israel’s dependency on the U.S. violates the principle of non-alignment, once a cornerstone of the Labor Zionist movement. A number of Israelis and other left-wing Zionists argue that, like any other nationalist movement, Zionism has its pluralist, democratic and inclusivist elements alongside reactionary, chauvinistic and militarist elements. The primary reason the latter has dominated, they argue, is not anything inherent within Zionism per se, but the blank check offered by the U.S., which encourages Israeli oppression of its Middle Eastern neighbors and close ties with the West, undermining the last vestiges of Labor Zionism’s commitment to socialism, non-alignment, and cooperation with the Third World.Foot note 2_41 As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it, «Israel’s obstinacy … serves the purposes of both our countries best.»Foot note 2_42 The rise of the Likud Bloc in Israel from an minority faction to the dominant party for over sixteen years, as well as the rightward drift of the Labor Party, is in large part due to this large-scale American support. No country with those kinds of policies could last very long in office, given the self-defeating effect of such militarization on economic grounds or in terms of international isolation, were they not supported to such a degree that they did not have to worry about the consequences of their policies on their own population.

These left-wing critics fear that Israel’s dependency on what is seen by many as an imperialist power like the United States alienates Israel’s potential allies in the Third World and leaves Israel vulnerable to the whims of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, some go as far as to argue Israel is being set up to be the scape goat for U.S. policy in the region, much like the Jews of Europe were set up as tax collectors, money lenders and other positions which left them open to popular reaction.Foot note 2_43

Dissent in the U.S.

U.S. aid to Israel, like most foreign aid, is not popular with the American public. According to a 1994 poll by the Wirthlin Group, a majority favored a phase out of aid to Israel by 1998. In another question, one-third of those polled called for an immediate phase out, a slightly larger amount called for a reduction and only 18% at current levels.Foot note 2_44 Foreign aid is generally unpopular among the American public, particularly from conservatives who are suspicious of internationalism in general and advocate a more isolationist foreign policy. Yet it has traditionally been the American left which has raised these issues and forced them into the national debate, most prominently with Central America, but in other Third World regions as well.
However, the American left, even among those concerned with issues of peace and justice in the Middle East, are divided over the question of aid. Historically, countries which invade and occupy the territory of its neighbors, engage in systematic human rights violations, refuse to recognize the national rights of a people that it exiles and continually subjugates, use American weapons against civilian targets, arm and train death squads, ignore United Nations resolutions, and systematically flaunt international legal conventions are subject to mobilization by American peace activists challenging U.S. aid.

Yet, just as with the tendency by some on the right to single out Israel for criticism, there is a tendency on the left to single out Israel for immunity from criticism. One problem with this is that the failure of peace and human rights activists to more aggressivley challenge assistance to the Israeli government on grounds of human rights, international law, and Israel’s own self-interest, results in some of the more prominent groups and individuals challenging U.S. aid to Israel being those who do not take principled positions on U.S foreign aid or arms transfers to Arab regimes with human records as bad or worse than Israel’s. Such double-standards leave such groups open to charges of anti-Semitism, which is not helped by their occasional appeals to nativistic sentiments that indeed sometimes contain anti-Semitic overtones.

One result of the lack of challenges to the continuation of high levels of unconditional aid to Israel is that it hampers Congressional efforts to curb U.S. military aid to repressive regimes elsewhere. Efforts to pass legislation that would restrict aid systematically to countries which refuse to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or engage in certain violations of international law have been blocked solely because the provisions of the bill would include Israel.

It is doubtful that Israel could afford the heavy economic burden of continuing their occupation of neighboring Arab lands, such as the costs of maintaining the military forces in the territories, the construction of illegal settlements, and the expanded infrastructure to bypass autonomous Palestinian population centers, without U.S. financial support. Another problem is that the increasingly interlocked military-industrial complexes of the two nations have furthered the questionable projection of U.S. military power in other conflict-ridden areas: For example, since the American peace movement had mobilized public opinion in the U.S. to levels which prohibited direct U.S. military assistance to Guatemala, South Africa, Iran, and the Contras, the U.S. simply armed these countries through Israel.

Yet virtually no leading political figures, outside some right-wing isolationists like Patrick Buchanan, have publicly questioned these ongoing high levels of U.S. aid to Israel. Most striking is that most prominent liberal Democrats, who have raised questions about U.S. aid to repressive regimes elsewhere, have categorically rejected linking aid to Israeli compliance with international law and human rights. While the role of the pro-Israel lobby is often exaggerated regarding as the determining factor in the overall thrust of U.S. Middle East policy,Foot note 2_45 there is little question that they have effectively neutralized liberal opposition on Capitol Hill.Foot note 2_46 Yet Congressional liberals have not had much in the way of pressure from the other direction: most liberal lobbying groups have avoided addressing the Middle East altogether.

Indeed, most organized peace and human rights groups have been unusually silent regarding U.S. aid to Israel, despite the fact that it is the largest recipient of U.S. aid. This comes in part due to the fact that, while most strategic analysts recognize that Israel — unlike some periods earlier in its history — is not under immediate military threat, there is still a widespread perception that Israel is under siege. As a result, those who oppose military aid to Israel are easily depicted as advocating the military destruction of the Jewish state, and are thus relegated to the fringe of U.S. public opinion along with anti-Jewish bigots. Consequently, there is virtually no chance that the U.S. government will consider a cessation or reduction in military aid to Israel any time in the foreseeable future. Therefore, many peace and human rights groups argue that they should focus their energy on more immediate attainable goals, such as supporting the ongoing peace process and supporting an Israeli freeze on expanding their settlements in the occupied territories, and not risk losing their political credibility on the aid issue. Furthermore, those opposing emphasis on the aid question believe that it raises an unnecessarily divisive issue at a time when there is a pressing need to reach out to those with a more mainstream political perspective in both the Jewish community and elsewhere, particularly since opposing military aid to Israel will inevitably be depicted as putting Israel’s survival at risk and thus alienate many potential allies.

Even if such a movement to cut U.S. aid were successful, so this argument goes, it may make matters worse. Such a cutoff may cause the Israeli public, increasingly open to the idea of granting the Palestinians at least some rights, to close ranks behind right-wing politicians and destroy the peace process. Many Israelis would see such a move as abandonment and betrayal, which would reinforce feelings of isolation and persecution built over centuries. According to this argument, this would not encourage necessary compromise, but may lead to even more reckless behavior by the Israeli military. Such concerns have led many Israelis on the left, including most of the recognized leadership of the Peace Now movement, to oppose any threatened cutoff or reduction in U.S. aid.

Those peace activists advocating this more cautious approach point out that many critics of Israeli policies do not share such universal principles, and use Israeli violations of human rights and international law as an excuse for attacking the world’s only Jewish state. While such people are certainly a minority among those critical of U.S. policy in the Middle East, it reinforces a widespread assumption that any criticism of U.S. support of the Israeli government carries just such a hidden agenda. For this reason, many who support a two-state solution and a more even-handed U.S. policy believe that a confrontational approach is counter-productive, that there should be no threats on a reduction of aid and that any criticism of the Israeli government should be kept private. While critics of this approach note its similarity with the Reagan and Bush administrations’ «quiet diplomacy» toward Latin American dictatorships and «constructive engagement» towards South Africa, its defenders observe that Israel’s isolation and the Jews’ history of persecution dictates the utilization of such a cautious strategy.

During the 1980s, many liberals supported U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government of Jose Napoleon Duarte, despite the ongoing gross and systematic human rights violations by the government and its armed forces. Supporters of Duarte successfully argued that the moderate Christian Democratic leader needed support to stave off threats from the right-wing ARENA party, which had close ties to the country’s notorious death squads, and a victory by the rightists would make the situation even worse. Similarly, despite serious questions about the Labor government’s commitment to human rights, international law, and even its timely and fair implementation of its commitments to the Palestinian Authority, many supporters of peace in the Middle East insist that unconditional support of the Labor government was necessary to prevent an election victory by the Likud.

Indeed, Americans for Peace Now, one of the few American Jewish groups to openly challenge the Likud government’s policies, argues that U.S. to Israel should be kept at current levels to maintain the «strong and prosperous Israel necessary to make peace.»Foot note 2_47

Impact on the Peace Process

Aid to Israel, particularly in recent years, has been justified as necessary to support the peace process. However, as noted authority on negotiations Roger Fisher has observed, one must apply both a carrot and a stick to convince a party to make the compromises necessary in diplomacy. Using either one alone denies the party you are trying to influence any incentive.Foot note 2_48 Yet, the U.S. has used the carrot with Israel almost exclusively. With repeated public pronouncements by U.S. officials that aid to Israel is unconditional, Israel has no incentive to make the necessary concessions which could lead to peace, or even to end its human rights abuses and violations of international law. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once told a colleague, «I ask Rabin to make concessions, and he says he can’t because Israel is weak. So I given him more arms, and he say he doesn’t need to make concessions because Israel is strong.»Foot note 2_49
This is in contrast to the frequent use of aid as leverage to Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and other Arab states, as well as the Palestinian authority.

Yet it has long been in the U.S. interests to maintain a militarily-powerful belligerent Israel dependent on the United States. Real peace could undermine such a relationship. The United States therefore has pursued a policy of Pax Americana, one which might bring greater stability to the region while falling short of real peace. The Camp David agreement was a prime example, in that it more closely resembled a tripartite military pact that a true peace treaty, promising more than $5 billion of additional weaponry and economic assistance to both countries and closer American strategic cooperation. The U.S. refused to follow through on provisions of the agreement calling for Palestinian autonomy, increasing aid to Israel even as Jewish colonization and anti-Palestinian repression in the territories greatly increased. Indeed, this aid package was supposed a one-time loan, but has since evolved into an annual grant which takes up the majority of the foreign aid budget.

The ability of those in the United States and Israel who oppose the large-scale and unconditional aid relationship to mobilize effectively will perhaps determine the fate of the peace process. As of now, those who support the status quo — American and Israeli military and political officials, American supporters of the Israeli government and U.S. arms manufacturers — currently exercise enormous political power. Indeed, despite some of the opinions of critics cited in this article, there has been virtually no debate on a national scale in either country about the risks inherent in this ongoing relationship.

The result could be tragic, not just for the Palestinians, Lebanese and others who are the immediate victims of the largess of American aid to Israel, but ultimately for Israel as well. Like El Salvador and South Vietnam, Israel has become a client state whose leadership has made common cause with U.S. global designs in ways that could ultimately lead to the country’s self-destruction. Israeli leaders and their counterparts in many American Zionist organizations have been repeating the historic error of trading short-term benefits for their people at the risk of long-term security. For Israel’s economic and military security ultimately will come not from the amount of economic and military aid it receives from the United States, but on its willingness to make peace with its neighbors, particularly the Palestinians, recognizing that they too have a right for freedom and security. For in the end, Israeli security and Palestinian rights are not mutually exclusive, but mutually dependent on the other.

Stephen Zunes

Department of Politics. University of San Francisco
2130 Fulton Street. San Francisco, CA 94117, U.S.A.
[Foot Note 1_1]
Originally published in Middle East Policy. Displayed here thanks to the author’s kind permission.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 1_2]

Stephen Zunes is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics at the University of San Francisco.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_1]

Congressional Research Service, «Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance», August 30, 1995, compiled by Clyde Mark.

This amount is higher than even that of the highly-quoted Soviet aid to Cuba in the thirty years prior to 1991.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_2]

Martha Wenger, «U.S. Aid to Israel: From Handshake to Embrace,» Middle East Report, May-August 1990Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_3]

The breakdown of grant aid over the official $3 billion is as follows includes bank charges incurred by U.S. government for lump sum withdrawal ($60 million); interest earned by Israel on ESF aid money reinested in U.S. treasury notes ($90 million); supplemental State Department funded aid ($93.5 million); supplemental Defense Department items ($242.3 million); a contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service ($17 million); assistance from the Commerce Department ($2.5 million) [«House Appropriations Committee Funds U.S.-Israeli Cooperation,» Near East Rport, Vol. XXXIX, No. 18, Aug. 14, 1995, p. 99 and Shawn Twing, «A Comprehensive Guide to U.S. Aid to Israel,» Washington Report on Middle East Affairs» April 1996, p. 7]Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_4]

In other countries which receives U.S. economic aid, there is an AID mission as part of the US Embassy which audits all the relevant expenditures. Without such a presence in Israel, there have been a number of scandals involving U.S. funds, such as when General Electric’s manager for Israel was caught paying kickbacks to Israeli authorities responsible for procurement, or when General Rami Dotan was found to be siphoning off US funds for his personal use.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_5]

Figures cited in Edward T. Pound, «A Close Look at U.S. Aid to Israel Reveals Deals That Push Cost Above Publicly Quoted Figures,» The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 19, 1991, p. A16Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_6]

Martha Wenger, «The Money Tree: US Aid to Israel», Middle East Report, May-Aug. 1990, p. 12. Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_7]

Ibid.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_8]

Background briefing, Department of State, March 26, 1996Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_9]

Cited in Joel Bainerman, «Looking the Gift Horse in the Mouth: Israelis Ask if U.S. Generosity Might Actually Be Hurting their Country,» Washington Post, Oct. 29, 1995, p. C4Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_10]

This commitment to Israeli superiority is often casts in terms of compensating for the superior numerical strength of the combined forces of neighboring Arab states. However, not only are Israeli forces far better trained and more mobile, but the idea of large numbers of Arab states uniting to destroy Israel at this point is highly questionable at best.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_11]

Karen L. Puschel, U.S.-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: An American Perspective, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, p. 150Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_12]

Glenn Frankel, Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1986Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_13]

Cited in Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America’s Secret Relations With a Militant Israel, Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988, p. 250Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_14]

Also known as the Guam Doctrine, or «surrogate strategy,» where a Third World ally would be capable of military intervention on behalf of the U.S., thus minimizing the political risks from direct American military intervention. I describe the policy in relation to the Persian Gulf in my article «U.S.-GCC: Its Rise and Potential Fall» in Middle East Policy, Vol. II; No. 1, 1993, particularly pp. 103-104.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_15]

The chronology of aid figures is taken from Wenger, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_16]

Pound, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_17]

Ronald Young, Missed Opportunities for Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy 1981-1986, Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1988Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_18]

Interviews at Ben Gurion University in Beersheva, January 1994.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_19]

David Hoffman, Washington Post, June 10, 1993Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_20]

Ruth E. Steele, «Why Republicans Have Put Cuts In Aid to Israel ‘Off the Table’», Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April/May 1995, p. 41-42Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_21]

Lucille Barnes, «Once Again, Israel Gets Away With Spending U.S. Aid on Settlements,» Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Oct-Nov 1995Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_22]

Nathan Jones, «Exempting Israel Makes Foreign Aid Savings Insignificant,» Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1995, p. 44Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_23]

Steele, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_24]

Interview, May 12, 1992, Seattle, Washington.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_25]

Alan Kronstadt et al, Hostile Takeover: How the Aerospace Industries Association Gain Control of American Foreign Policy and Double Arms Transfers to Dictators, Washington: Project on Demilitarization and Democracy, 1995.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_26]

Joshua Goldstein, PACs in Profile: Spending Patterns in the 1994 Elections, Washington: Center for Responsive Politics, June 1995.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_27]

Twing, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_28]

Interview with Major General Mattityahu Peled (Ret.), May 12, 1992, Seattle, Washington.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_29]

It is noteworthy that in the development of a new anti-missile defense system for Israel, the U.S. initially insisted that it be mobile, despite the Israeli preference for a cheaper and simpler fixed system, which would have been quite adequate for their small territory.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_30]

Bainerman, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_31]

Simcha Bahiri, «A Peace Economy for Israel, The New Economy, Spring 1995.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_32]

Bainerman, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_33]

Ibid.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_34]

Ibid.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_35]

Charles Lane, «Rabble Rousing: National Insecurity» New Republic, June 12, 1995.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_36]

Peled, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_37]

Department of State, op. cit.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_38]

Matti Peled, New Outlook, May/June 1975Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_39]

Nathan Shaham, Yediot Ahronot, Nov. 28, 1996, cited in Noam Chomsky, World Orders Old and New, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 206.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_40]

B. Michael, Ha’aretz, Nov. 11, 1983, cited in Ibid.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_41]

For example, see Cherie Brown, et al, «A Draft Policy on Jewish Liberation, Ruah Hadashah #4 (1981); particularly, pp. 11-13.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_42]

Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little, Brown, Company, 1982, p. 621Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_43]

For example, see Cherie Brown, op. cit. I elaborate on this thesis in my article, «Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Imperialism,» in Peace Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1994).Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_44]

Wirthlin group, 95% confidence level, polled Sept. 6-8, 1994. 53% favored phase out, 36% opposed, 11% don’t know or no opinion. On the question of amount of aid, 33% said cutoff, 36% said reduction, 18% current levels, 6% increase, 6% don’t know or no opinion. Cited in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Nov/Dec 1994.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_45]

See my article «The Roots of the U.S.-Israeli Relationship,» New Political Science, Spring-Summer 1992, Nos. 21-22.

For similar conclusions, albeit from a very different perspective, see A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, especially chapter 3.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_46]

The pro-Israel lobby and its related political action committees also take advantage of the overall strategic relationship to influence certain fiscal aspects of the relationship, i.e. payments to Israel in one lump some as opposed to quarterly, etc.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_47]

Interview with director Barry Rubin, April 29, 1996.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_48]

Roger Fisher et al, Beyond Machiavelli, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.Back to main body of the paper

[Foot Note 2_49]

Edward Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East, New York: Readers Digest Press, 1976, p. 200Back to main body of the paper