June 24, 2026: “It is not going to be smooth sailing, but my sense is that the Trump administration recognizes that there is too much at stake for it to fail. The MOU is being attacked as a bad deal, as being worse than the JCPOA, and worse than what they could have gotten Iran to agree to prior to the launch of the war and Iran recognizing the power it had to disrupt the global economy – all of which are true. It is nevertheless likely the most realistic alternative at this point.
Israel will try to sabotage the deal, but Trump, unlike previous US presidents, does not have an ideological commitment to Israel. His approach to foreign policy is purely transactional…”
June 10, 2026, “Trump has made it clear to the Israelis that a full-scale resumption of the bombing would be unacceptable, but he is apparently willing to support a low-level war indefinitely. Meanwhile, Israel is expanding its occupation of the Gaza Strip to close to 70% of the territory in violation of the ceasefire agreement and with the apparent support of the Trump administration. Occasional air strikes, with additional civilian casualties, continue as well. And, in the West Bank, settler militias, in ways comparable to the rightwing death squads in Central America during the 1980s, continue to terrorize the Palestinian population with the acquiescence of the Israeli government and, extension, the US government.”
“There was some real hope a few weeks ago with news of a memorandum of understanding between US and Iranian negotiators, with the apparent support of the Arab Gulf states, Turkey, and Egypt. Trump rejected it, however, because it would involve unfreezing illegally withheld Iranian assets and would allow Iran to continue reprocessing limited amounts of uranium, similar to the 2015 nuclear deal that Trump has repeatedly condemned. Even the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz would be hard to depict as a victory since it had been fully open prior to the war.”
On Lebanon: “It is hard to imagine Iran agreeing to reopen the Strait without a comprehensive ceasefire and possibly an Israeli withdrawal from occupied parts of the country. Israel’s decision to expand its occupation [was] to increase pressure on the Lebanese government, even though it is essentially powerless to control Hezbollah…. Most political factions in Israel either support Netanyahu’s actions or believe he should escalate.”
